Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 822f8b88c5fdf09f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

84.8 KB Created: 2021-09-03 22:24:28 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-16
MD5: 7236ebbbced34c3f03c5978ed814626d SHA-1: 509cecee1c932a77279eee9d85b3c4ed6fe3e5b5 SHA-256: 822f8b88c5fdf09f989f5b9def4887aba09f308ac9ac9f34b1a9d9756b29aed2
214 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file was flagged as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. The heuristics reveal a link farm structure with numerous embedded URLs pointing to potentially compromised CMS uploads and disposable hosting, suggesting a phishing or payload delivery scheme. The presence of repeated invisible links further supports the lure tactic.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9974

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Invisible/repeated PDF links deliver payload file critical PDF_REPEATED_PAYLOAD_LINK_LURE
    PDF uses invisible link annotations and points to a direct payload download. Repeated invisible links or lure-like payload names such as document/unlock/verify archives match malware-delivery PDF carriers where the page is only a prompt and the real payload is fetched from the linked URL.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://chcial.ru/uplcv?utm_term=bitdefender+rescue+cd+manual+update+cumulative.zip In PDF document text
    • http://viaterrestre.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bdb9495344b---67510002017.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://koreayokogawa.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/lanozedivijeludono.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://seitonsolutions.com/ci/files/notadiwovomigoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bibliotheque-des-arts.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/35854986713.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rmp-traueranzeigen.de/cms/files/keziwanaxejonata.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.europesolidaire.eu/userfiles/files/nasamozanododof.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.communityheroesproject.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ae3d63c5a81---meror.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tpdw.pl/userfiles/file/febadegabelitusi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://neksav.com/upload/ckfinder/files/puxov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fablab808.com/nbloom/fckuploads/file/surozaderikajasef.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kamber.dk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ed736096114bbd6a02e7f75bae8baf24/81441890712.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dekoblickfang.de/userfiles/file/zufokesolima.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://interface-referencement.com/userfiles/file/88908528227.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.bramfordgc.co.uk/ckfinder/userfiles/files/98208043369.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.77ice.com/upload/files/temadajukaxafirofiborujud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.icodar.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16094507f0d4d7---wupavuxowidebejujevifo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ascinfratech.com/clientprojects/trading/file/wowivezagoxufuga.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bungefamily.com/clients/5233/File/xerabadab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://medtek.vn/storage/file/4598605019.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pemaboutiquehotel.com/assets/userfiles/files/danuvefawejos.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://virker-ikke.dk/files/9152240649.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://skup-laptopow.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608f08184a1c6---66181242137.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xn--80akij1ajew.xn--p1ai/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b0529c566cd---nelezapederu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zs.tom.ru/jsplugins/ckfinder/userfiles/files/sovotupug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000de1f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDE1F 20196 bytes
SHA-256: 1f55db8515fe3bf5d6add02352b296a74fffce37786c4a7aac7fb15e0cedb02a
font_01_sfnt_off00011328.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11328 11008 bytes
SHA-256: 0b21965d7339b1e4b2b04a24c1f51eaadf0365878a0f46dd397cfbb421b05a56
font_02_sfnt_off00012ccc.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12CCC 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1