Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 821da043968833ba…

MALICIOUS

PDF

55.8 KB Created: 2020-11-09 10:06:21 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-02-23
MD5: 473cf7f32b6beaacc2856e96855a04bd SHA-1: 56a28ce63e4f802bebb2973fed55f7ad0850fcea SHA-256: 821da043968833ba74950a68a7a9a44894f423a115f833a85f45dcbdb164b9e6
184 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffking.ru/aws?keyword=watch+movies+online+free+the+joker In PDF document text
    • https://nukafezika.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134510633/1414971.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wesikuwufo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134647185/8933001.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://welawebunigekuk.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134713971/nageverokabunezawu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zosupexaduj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738593/3355060.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kagilovudugavap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164538/dimiweru.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mazogerivajusem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134341978/xegekop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jawokipuroz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134265350/dabutiki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xabalaru/34308705169.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/68ca78be-2025-45d4-8eae-5eab353b5bd4/jenowixowoxeduduwidixo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4ef9015f-3f68-4cc6-bf24-92a2e45c20bf/juwinuraz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zonebon/the_hiding_place_chapter_5_summary.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/sikuva/sierra_nevada_swimming_time_standards.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e4131334-2e87-4139-978c-18af031915c3/madinah_arabic_book_1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f43fbd2b-27df-43a2-9dfe-a4f2c2acde2b/who_knows_mommy_best_printable_template.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f3d2fa0a-e9be-42c9-8f74-14f3c586562e/28195172115.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/1dec7aa2-9c99-46ba-ae80-5ff9a7fcadad/my_wii_won_t_read_discs.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00009bae.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9BAE 5332 bytes
SHA-256: fb44124d8d92a980319c451d92bb7c5f08a6d611732098f9944a1edb52b4eea2
font_01_sfnt_off0000adbd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xADBD 10520 bytes
SHA-256: 121f58b935e6c91ab20411ee9939d420ce201330b7fdc63461f4725aaeaf9a0b

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