Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 821cc6c4b968fdf0…

MALICIOUS

PDF

55.8 KB Created: 2020-10-12 22:05:26 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-29
MD5: 7f5136113aed4deb31f83d12330c445e SHA-1: 2607c5e349295c37e6097a36c78f000d30fcbfa7 SHA-256: 821cc6c4b968fdf08f8a0b765bc2ef84cca37e0e94296c7c7dfc40b6d11d3cb8
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, identified as a link farm. One of these links, https://cctraff.ru/strik?keyword=similitud+geometrica+cinematica+y+dinamica+pdf, is flagged as a malicious redirector. The document's primary function appears to be directing users to a network of external PDF files, likely for SEO spam or to distribute further malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/strik?keyword=similitud+geometrica+cinematica+y+dinamica+pdf In PDF document text
    • https://site-1048222.mozfiles.com/files/1048222/21973389263.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1048576.mozfiles.com/files/1048576/nakosebu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036969.mozfiles.com/files/1036969/vatekaneva.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039163.mozfiles.com/files/1039163/kokas.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.mtllabfsu.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856039/88227c7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.peacockhills.org/uploads/1/3/2/6/132680781/e9ce6e2d51.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036698.mozfiles.com/files/1036698/45394805469.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1038653.mozfiles.com/files/1038653/73051986323.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039283.mozfiles.com/files/1039283/91832703434.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://todina.bethelchapelny.org/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070588/4608730.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.lafesmith.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383958/kokexuxuxibe_selilumututej_puxow_mezurapag.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.muppetschildrenscentres.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739684/3196024.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nikixa.ekstasisinstitute.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776791/f0afea.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007e77.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7E77 5384 bytes
SHA-256: 1094f7e407fe22cec410bebdbcb2b73910a00de1f24f1963601dc9bcd6eff463
font_01_sfnt_off000090aa.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x90AA 16128 bytes
SHA-256: f853f5d4441b548e9ccc6ed12c38530b5707307a980c6895a3e04e2e24cab1e5
font_02_sfnt_off0000c1b9.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC1B9 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 1158d95dac44631f497756703988ba3645251422e7ff0015d3fca430225e7c3e

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