Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 81f496ce09537b21…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

322.2 KB Created: 2021-06-08 12:43:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: c29d959490ceeba42ab970d145f52954 SHA-1: e695911b8c2781e73b83286e24198cff8314d8bd SHA-256: 81f496ce09537b213e9425943def2e819fde1edef785424e7411723fe4a4c2b6
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The document contains an embedded OLE object which is flagged as a risky file type that drops an auto-executable payload, specifically identified as a JAR file. This indicates a likely attempt to deliver and execute malware upon opening the document. The presence of the embedded OLE object and the associated extracted artifacts are the primary indicators.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
a78d6bb8a96c837776e1b255ffdee8ee1c06af82fc6a93ff18754bb3d808f42b		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 320512 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.99, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
40f8c608eab0bae8efa6e33c4d245fdffe702aef1a9d214f8db758b5c74832fd		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 315374 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
5f26858f4a3752f03615736b3c17a67d546e46e018f177fb31b5ec1231327c84		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5448 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.