Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 81d9e0389970009a…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.3 KB
MD5: ae226a1575515af7e3006e5da75664e1 SHA-1: 1f96e760d619117d3a71a21f1465b6a5fbb93b50 SHA-256: 81d9e0389970009a15ed35e003f8feb500bcb1c684b7a6b16d4fe9fc028a1abc
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object and specifically triggers the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristic, indicating exploitation of a vulnerability within the Equation Editor component. The presence of \objupdate further suggests that the embedded object is designed to be activated, leading to arbitrary code execution. This is a common technique for delivering malicious payloads.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000e5.bin
babe05c0dd9def04a2e3d13a52dbb0fea165d76d0ad43986c008d1a30b1fcadb		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xE5 1823 bytes

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