Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 81cc40b5a4d05aeb…

MALICIOUS

PDF

89.5 KB Created: 2021-06-09 07:34:07 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: f3261cef1cb8a9ad2e3b628973fa0f25 SHA-1: 4c5c861e34510acecc216c6f0bb00e78b26065a8 SHA-256: 81cc40b5a4d05aeb1f2ca6ef79525e414d00cf6f91309d14853f40475dca61d2
236 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file was flagged by ML classifiers and ClamAV as malicious, exhibiting characteristics of a phishing lure. It contains numerous embedded URLs pointing to compromised websites and disposable hosting, suggesting an attempt to distribute malicious content or harvest credentials. The heuristic 'SE_MFA_LURE' indicates the document likely prompts the user for multi-factor authentication codes or similar sensitive information.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • MFA / one-time-code harvesting lure high SE_MFA_LURE
    Document asks for a one-time code, authenticator approval, or MFA confirmation — consistent with credential phishing kits that steal session tokens or abuse multi-factor authentication
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://synerhu.ru/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+reset+hikvision+ip+camera+ds+2cd1021+i
    • https://anfauglir.com/images/file/zetejiwewifulilupiwu.pdf
    • https://goldenparadisestsimons.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/752b39a8471ea20ff01b5064cd4a7068/16200764952.pdf
    • http://goteneplast.se/files/images/file/fuvad.pdf
    • http://camonetinternational.com/files/file/36895504837.pdf
    • https://grahampropertytax.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/aae0580530be10bbdf5ddb637170c1f4/kefigokaf.pdf
    • http://debandhelder.nl/ckfinder/userfiles/files/10038804478.pdf
    • https://www.ltgpartners.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/431cc9eae166454522a496c75be7a046/wexenu.pdf
    • http://www.adatechotomasyon.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b1a29dc2d79---25381001017.pdf
    • http://www.nationaalgolfcongres.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b6f65e4c99f---41858089434.pdf
    • https://jdbailbonds.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4f06a8274cf7704848a0d263abd41a51/kedasugerewonoti.pdf
    • https://phase1acoustics.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606d12c487be6---89239872114.pdf
    • https://ewms.vn/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/nt5jgjlv9c3ee5gg14hnaed5d2/56066108846.pdf
    • http://mdsalon.ru/img/lib/file/882483888.pdf
    • https://socialchangefactory.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/81bd9b36f96dc0fbc47b085fbbb1fc79/fegipovixitaguxegifiwoli.pdf
    • https://arerp.kr/data/file/%5C/4116897202.pdf
    • http://ahcxdq.com/uploads/file/050435422884.pdf
    • https://ctapigroup3.com/contents//files/21101348593.pdf
    • https://omomediacion.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b41fce9172fb9400301a06165c610dbe/venazekerazetiditis.pdf
    • http://datev.hu/ckfinder/userfiles/files/busuna.pdf
    • http://mirandatutoringcentre.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16082cd849aee8---95944814304.pdf
    • http:///System/configurationFile?auth=YWRtaW46MTEK
    • http:///Syst��m/configurationFile?auth=YWRtaW46MTEK
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00010feb.bin
7ecc0f0443061368c8ac8039537421207d9c7d8c5d4df2ad10d1d981a5e038ef
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10FEB 5784 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0001238c.bin
dbf3ef883127bc8040d80e2e574c04a304d2306ddde73eaef350edd09cd0a420
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1238C 20048 bytes