Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 81c7eef54c852dd6…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

3.81 MB Created: 2022-03-15 03:39:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2022-03-15
MD5: 65f0d3cb106084ddadc6c2129f702517 SHA-1: 4476657d32a55ca0d89d21d2a828a8d8cbc5dbab SHA-256: 81c7eef54c852dd68050147f77f937933cbff1c22722617180ca386ef55918ab
242 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains an obfuscated VBA macro that executes PowerShell. The macro uses `CreateObject` to instantiate a `WScript.Shell` object and then calls its `Exec` method with a string that is decoded from hexadecimal. This pattern strongly suggests the macro is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload. The document body discusses geopolitical topics related to Ukraine, likely serving as a lure.

Heuristics 7

  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL
    Reference to PowerShell
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://euromaidan-press.com/2019/10/15/steinmeier-formula-protest-continue-as-12000-march-in-kyiv-ukraine/
    • http://euromaidan-press.com/2019/10/08/the-real-problem-with-steinmeiers-formula-and-the-russo-ukrainian-war/
    • https://www.unian.info/politics/10721028-kremlin-comments-on-kyiv-s-demand-to-dissolve-lpr-dpr.html
    • https://informnapalm.org/en/surkovleaks
    • https://informnapalm.org/en/surkovleaks-part2/
    • https://rusi.org/publication/occasional-papers/surkov-leaks-inner-workings-russias-hybrid-war-ukraine
    • http://euromaidanpress.com/2019/08/30/commemorating-ilovaisk-bloody-august-battle-that-changed-worlds-view-of-war-in-donbas131681/
    • https://web.archive.org/web/20180625133442/http://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/petro-poroshenko-predstaviv-v-donbasi-mirnij-plan-z-vregulyu-33044
    • http://euromaidanpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/MinskEN2.pdf
    • http://euromaidanpress.com/wp-content/up-
    • http://euromaidanpress.com/wp-
    • http://euromaidanpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/SpecialStatusEN-1.pdf
    • https://web.archive.org/web/20170821053249/https://nbnews.com.ua/ru/news/143365/
    • http://euromaidanpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11
    • https://tass.com/world/1079904
    • https://rg.ru/2015/07/16/donbass-poln.html
    • https://cont.ws/@ishchenko/101695
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
64a13c2fa66db1a04193661039d9b0a1b0825b9021d473fad4882c74b7fd6c66		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1172 bytes

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