Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 819202b59087ea64…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.9 KB Created: 2020-07-08 23:35:05 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 9e6c65ee29702af9072daf043f1773fd SHA-1: 429d67a9373bd61c1ea34817d6c11a266bc19c3a SHA-256: 819202b59087ea64273b5138d81439f1b9c96fdd33c8997127348ec745aac592
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a link disguised as an educational worksheet that redirects to a link farm hosting numerous other PDFs. This behavior is indicative of a phishing or spam campaign designed to drive traffic to potentially malicious or low-quality content. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious, supporting the assessment of a malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/wb?keyword=simple%20compound%20complex%20sentences%20worksheet%20middle%20school
    • http://files.abetteryou7.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681264/6040056.pdf
    • http://files.writingarguments.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132683147/6249117.pdf
    • http://files.chuckcrabbe.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131408913/pavefujisupi-wosipevopudupu-perozo.pdf
    • http://files.nanolab.info/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379749/befuraxigufero.pdf
    • http://files.washk12internships.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775131/2e1a215b1ea3.pdf
    • http://files.moirajo.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132710655/6052939.pdf
    • http://files.mrbrasher.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453284/fewasuxefedoxoruwaj.pdf
    • http://files.barriointellect.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740321/104c7d.pdf
    • http://files.kansas-al-anon.org/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813965/659c5a44409ed.pdf
    • http://files.agbcontracting.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132712514/2125422.pdf
    • http://files.12monthbeauty.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874128/6301925.pdf
    • http://files.teamingupforteens.org/uploads/1/3/2/6/132683088/1e507d14b84560.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://kemuzap.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/nepegebepa.pdf
    • https://kozoribudos.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/81260785111.pdf
    • https://bezuwovarek227136405.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/toviki.pdf
    • https://guzebamukubu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/vujaba.pdf
    • https://degarese.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/xaguporepujona.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/71895612735.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/52733892229.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/dijovosulodomozov.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/35209966956.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006a87.bin
8395e763b3a5abbb7f4733ba6c72e76acae09d3e9f3fa367276795247ce0475e		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6A87 5312 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007c72.bin
a2ac27b4aac92aae1e736ad328252052966567965cee8ace6bc31c8e1febfbec		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7C72 9924 bytes

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