Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8171985877153910…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1004.5 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 5e05591a5b7195792124d01e3aebcda1 SHA-1: ab7e4a16f3d5882193d8c801fca18f375f8d60c3 SHA-256: 81719858771539103a06d16ba77668b59fcdc4e1fcc72e5ad64f192e3357c3e3
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The file is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor. Critical heuristics indicate the exploitation of CVE-2017-8759, a vulnerability in MSXML SAX OLE activation, which allows for arbitrary code execution. The embedded URL is benign, but the exploit itself is the primary indicator of malicious intent.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000f12df.bin
d2c7561760ea775adf2cfcb4d6a7ad9a14af6cce8f13a5cdae93b073dabca875
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xF12DF 3739 bytes