Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 816542c8eaf39768…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

126.5 KB
MD5: 5fba88b7781fbf0d1ff755168eead7bf SHA-1: a4c32914c8c8e2101f3cfa7cde83eeda4f90177e SHA-256: 816542c8eaf3976805acc60143548b98323a3f6471fad417b46aab340282fe6d
302 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an OLE Excel file containing VBA macros. Heuristics indicate the use of WinExec, CreateProcess, VirtualAlloc, VirtualProtect, WriteProcessMemory, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress, suggesting the macro attempts to inject and execute code. The presence of embedded URLs, though currently benign, is typical for malware downloaders. The large slack space in the OLE structure is also a common evasion technique.

Heuristics 9

  • Reference to WriteProcessMemory API critical SC_STR_WRITEPROCESSMEMORY
    Reference to WriteProcessMemory API
  • Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXEC
    Reference to WinExec API
  • Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS
    Reference to CreateProcess API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 129,536 bytes but its declared streams total only 56,346 bytes — 73,190 bytes (57%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API
  • Reference to VirtualProtect API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALPROTECT
    Reference to VirtualProtect API
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.microsoft.com
    • https://www.verisign.com/rpa
    • http://ocsp.verisign.com/ocsp/status0
    • https://www.verisign.com/rpa0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CodeSignPCA.crl0

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