Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 815286b8702e9c36…

MALICIOUS

PDF

39.0 KB Created: 2020-07-09 18:43:55 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: cf54060384c3fc5ed3fd48913e2f2931 SHA-1: 7d527158529f27811f3bf3159ffa06464052b57f SHA-256: 815286b8702e9c36284f969ec5c44e53603020cf95c163efdd59f865fdf0b104
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document contains a large number of embedded URLs, many of which point to disposable hosting and appear to be part of a link farm. One critical heuristic indicates that the document links to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious, suggesting a high likelihood of it being used for malicious redirection or phishing campaigns.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/wb?keyword=pdf%20split%20and%20merge%20basic%202.2.2
    • http://files.parkcityea.org/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874110/nurovarogokiwa.pdf
    • http://files.elizabethkpetersonlab.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384789/sibufajoj-xuvini.pdf
    • http://files.grettawilson.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437351/5306487.pdf
    • http://files.itsthabom.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070751/pavarusevigef_nivoxigasuvi_pojagufalu.pdf
    • http://files.tonypalermolifecoach.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437740/eaf0f757.pdf
    • http://files.shearserenitysalon.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383553/53b9878d6b0f11.pdf
    • http://files.perfxhockey.co.uk/uploads/1/3/1/1/131163516/jodejuzuziwu.pdf
    • http://files.jessicaluni.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131454238/2391604.pdf
    • http://files.badgrrlbrenda.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132682883/timipuwitaxovozemawa.pdf
    • http://files.thecovenantschristandyou.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379434/94345039.pdf
    • http://files.mothersyoke.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856331/2222389.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://rikowowirami.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/tudavukovi.pdf
    • https://paxologon.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/fesomudugaxanababosivutos.pdf
    • https://riverazirot.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/47604585294.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/54313135065.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/gijamibumiji.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/44758106853.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/51191810805.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/mejamuzeditika.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/xoperesotojazi.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000058b4.bin
05a3d726022cd49a9e696b4c8e890b79c7a0edb84fb25124202f0e97a1bd7532
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x58B4 5460 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00006b21.bin
8de3ac62d32ed373d01a1abb8fb40a744ed14ece4518ef00ff2d711d44bc393c
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6B21 10448 bytes