Malware Insights
The PDF file contains multiple embedded JavaScript streams, indicated by the PDF_JAVASCRIPT and PDF_JS heuristics. The PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_HEX_EVAL_STAGER heuristic specifically points to an annotation subject being used to decode and execute a stager. The extracted JavaScript files, particularly 'numeric_charcode_stage_000.js', are likely responsible for further deobfuscation and execution of malicious code, potentially downloading additional payloads. The confidence is slightly reduced due to the lack of explicit URL IOCs in the provided evidence, but the presence of multiple JavaScript stages strongly suggests a downloader or dropper functionality.
Heuristics 6
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Annotation subject hex-decoded eval stager critical PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_HEX_EVAL_STAGERPDF OpenAction JavaScript decodes a decimal char-code launcher, enumerates annotation subjects with syncAnnotScan()/getAnnots(), turns dash-delimited hex bytes into JavaScript with String.fromCharCode(), and evals the staged result. This is an exploit-kit delivery pattern and not normal PDF form logic.
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JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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String.fromCharCode low PDF_FROMCHARCODEString.fromCharCode found — used to construct payload strings dynamically. Common in benign JavaScript libraries for codepoint manipulation, so this alone is informational; weaponised use is also caught by the dedicated fromCharCode-stage and exploit-shape rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
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syncAnnotScan annotation-staging primitive low PDF_FOXIT_SYNCANNOTSCANPDF JavaScript calls syncAnnotScan() — a no-op annotation-enumeration primitive used by exploit-kit JavaScript to stage payload reads from annotation /Subject fields before eval(). Not a vulnerable sink itself; rarely seen in legitimate PDFs. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
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Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
Extracted artifacts 3
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
javascript_obj0004_000.jsb771a67801a2a024471cb29d8ce119b13dc98b5c56ef213dece7e1a5cc7b8bed |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 4 at offset 0xE1 | 1814 bytes |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
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numeric_charcode_stage_000.js4718a27c2224fc36bf24f8e8e04598f1ad78adce4401c7be2708318738a6983d |
deobfuscated-js | numeric char-code string decoded JavaScript at offset 0xEF | 469 bytes |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
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legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.jsc7c34e75074d1a9b4e27e09d4d22882e483b81ddbe8d1decf1ee440dfc55208d |
deobfuscated-js | repeated-marker hex decoded JavaScript at offset 0x1A73 | 12133 bytes |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
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