RTF malware analysis — malicious · 81097dc41117a378

MALICIOUS

RTF

1.55 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00

MD5: 3cbf6a728518875d0cd4c2754122c41c SHA-1: e8f7ee525d839b27cc480dfb704a6333ceca7afb SHA-256: 81097dc41117a378f4774d7da7e7db0377e1917862d4029a7487b1ecb13d674d

182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object that leverages the CVE-2017-11882 Equation Editor vulnerability. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution when the object is activated, likely through a ".objupdate" directive. The presence of this exploit indicates a malicious intent to compromise the user's system.

Heuristics 6

Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 likely critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE

RTF decodes to an activated Microsoft Equation 3.0 OLE storage whose payload is a high-entropy Ole10Native stream rather than normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is a weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape consistent with CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802.
Ole10Native stream in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM

RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an Ole10Native stream. This is a strong payload-container signal and is related to Word/OLE exploit delivery, but it is not specific enough on its own to assign a CVE.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2{

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00168c94.bin` `b19e96fd1c180a07d5b1f5b98f2adcc140cdfb2331c6f92ebf28c10e73231c0f`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x168C94	3732 bytes

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