Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 810331b99876d23a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

43.4 KB Created: 2020-10-30 03:59:23 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-27
MD5: 5b3e9ede1cb4d2297ddd2f7192d36a74 SHA-1: 17066c92ae9248acc599f203e924856277d26e6f SHA-256: 810331b99876d23ab63da17ad5da20ac6146831e8484877a084eed30b8b5d752
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to disposable hosting and redirector infrastructure, indicating a link farm designed to lead users to malicious sites. The presence of a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure further supports this. No scripts were extracted from this sample.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.link/123?keyword=dear+mr+henshaw+movie In PDF document text
    • https://vixepakezo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134447938/melonizipil.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4414695/normal_5f982566ed46f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zadumeredevasax.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453870/7006100.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4372086/normal_5f9adcd2bd135.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366377/normal_5f884e808238d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4383930/normal_5f8c16f157288.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dutitujazekap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814390/ef82e0d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369191/normal_5f88a8a6720f0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kizekusoviwo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453028/6580952.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4381978/normal_5f9444db1f3c6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4391314/normal_5f91644fccb77.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jarapitoxedomel.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437170/kifuvamuf-tigewelipok-jalug-koforaweri.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/sugaguxagu/30478079486.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tigovatolis/3d_printing_guidelines.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/cc6d4990-e668-4c5f-9ffc-165c1f2c40de/legend_of_zelda_phantom.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006a0e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6A0E 5044 bytes
SHA-256: 779e27ea76a88aab1008029e2665c1378d66f070486eb7694cd15df6032776c9
font_01_sfnt_off00007b22.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7B22 10952 bytes
SHA-256: f557572d8490128a5720520159e0eba25cd0949185123ac53e4c57368fe4a3aa

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