Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 80ff48a7d79ab0be…

MALICIOUS

RTF

14.3 KB First seen: 2023-03-04
MD5: a086b1062656053ee82dafd92eb00252 SHA-1: ecd541abbd001215adfeadaf7296844850941417 SHA-256: 80ff48a7d79ab0be1645decf79d42e3b9d5e5a00e2dec724f9af5d8f2669d48e
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive indicates that the embedded object will be activated automatically upon opening. This technique is commonly used to achieve arbitrary code execution, typically to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001665.bin
4ed59c4889dada10de1a58d8c3f8c6c70daa0a01360e85e764694538103ff85e
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1665 1905 bytes