RTF malware analysis — malicious · 80f733776515fd3c

MALICIOUS

RTF

12.6 KB

MD5: 6d8dafca8bfcaaae1489aec6eda6a878 SHA-1: 059a474a96f24843101e946634480016262993ba SHA-256: 80f733776515fd3c59c8be1c08bbbb9a257b02bbb2c9228c0a8831f846562508

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains an OLE object with an automatically linked Equation Editor object, which is a known exploit vector. The ".objupdate" directive indicates that the OLE object is intended to be activated automatically upon opening the document. This strongly suggests the file is designed to exploit a vulnerability in the Equation Editor to execute arbitrary code, likely leading to the download and execution of a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001c29.bin` `905334ecc1742874b5078909b9f4fc842c63c0b98bd8f639cfc5a46181859016`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1C29	2083 bytes

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