Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 80e6313cd38e8860…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

75.7 KB Created: 2021-03-23 04:01:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 53f9be677f49732e1704b32303e0452a SHA-1: a8edfd4f73060918ec3bc991cb247f28f26936e2 SHA-256: 80e6313cd38e886022636c2ffd19427e7f42b4707562ff291d8028460fe6a9b8
282 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains VBA macros, including an AutoOpen subroutine, which leverage WScript.Shell to execute a command. This command is designed to run a HTA file located at 'c:\users\public\main.hta', indicating the document's purpose is to download and execute a second-stage payload. The VBA code explicitly calls the 'exec' method on the WScript.Shell object to run the HTA file.

Heuristics 8

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
aeb20db8e9fb0eb871d0dff97b63973f67dadcea72e6dbbb1fd31fdad5e66c2d		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 4832 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 5 long base64-like blob(s).
vbaProject_00.bin
d590b6c1a2e8a88572807258d4555356a8e2ee3e9acc63fff222c957771744a6		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 28160 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 6 long base64-like blob(s).

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.