Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 80d906b61133f17f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

79.2 KB Created: 2021-02-21 00:29:04 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-19
MD5: 5c904fab9be85f79909539bf89eb9094 SHA-1: b1e99ac4a674d733af7fe2832454462840ec9065 SHA-256: 80d906b61133f17f90ed29f4b588cb5b3f824a2bc1d9dd482c47873391d7e95d
236 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://baarspo.ru/123?utm_term=how+to+connect+two+wireless+n+wifi+repeater PDF link annotation
    • http://fitokaps.xyz/what_is_the_setting_of_the_iliadbir4e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://reduslimitalia-ufficiale.site/wemuzoriwoselapalabkfj8v.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/tivanosox/GjaRphc/66984331588.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sivikowililip.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134599649/ronukopexe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://armlur.space/burger_king_menu_download3inkr.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://texno3ua.com/71450278714d4r41.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://durosokikiw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379956/e71737854.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/punipopi/anjbjif/silicon_valley_tv_show_lawyer_actor.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/jawuraxexije/Jhegeie/wosodotif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/noviraxat/ia8id1W/74879408394.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/sewuvavimebi/de2hctf/swap_swap_panda_level_7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/pirosisob/66928443288.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gofilafixu/80632058128.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/lazolu/91342312514.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/somamere/3326998452.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/pojikovewijeja/wedepa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/donake/nomezesebafudar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/rovikibixu/tifenuxunopazujida.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000fae5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFAE5 5064 bytes
SHA-256: c10ce64559c9989921172ecb533257d47a8f159aa5a63ad3f28824a4c8031a88
font_01_sfnt_off00010c40.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10C40 10368 bytes
SHA-256: 1cb3a1dc72a8843f00bcd78c8fe93ebe8c4d64030e7cfced07b1797fd066b854

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