Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 80d8f92d167e7cd5…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

1.16 MB
MD5: 9ad89fbc9364ec0f07010e478dc791b9 SHA-1: 50457caeaba8414e4616135b98b9bf175b721979 SHA-256: 80d8f92d167e7cd52b409823d9ef672f80a5ba183c8b406d2360d8e77c4d7646
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1559.001 Component Object Model

The sample is an encrypted OOXML file that contains an embedded Equation Editor OLE object. This object exhibits anomalies in its Ole10Native stream, suggesting it is designed to carry a malicious payload. The presence of the Equation Editor OLE object is a strong indicator of exploit delivery.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Equation Editor object carries payload-like Ole10Native stream high OLE_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE_PAYLOAD_ANOMALY
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object declares the Equation Editor CLSID but stores a large high-entropy Ole10Native stream with malformed package sizing. This is exploit-shaped Equation/OLE payload evidence.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.