Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 80b789937f3cd60d…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.0 KB
MD5: 8726ec9ae4067033f57f0689be9122a6 SHA-1: 13e0ff14efacc7df05ffe333422af1cf53e55dcf SHA-256: 80b789937f3cd60d70d53f22e1a622d51714e5b2ff1527c1da377e6dc3c911df
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and RTF_OBJAUTLINK heuristics strongly indicates exploitation of this component. The file's malicious verdict and the nature of the heuristics suggest it's designed to achieve arbitrary code execution upon opening.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000dc.bin
5976dda137c7dee702e3251e34f8c261527e2c4fdde97e89d89f3cb0074acf2a
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xDC 1837 bytes