Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 80b1d58755587a0e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

181.9 KB Created: 2021-08-25 07:00:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2021-11-07
MD5: 5f38c57f83ee5d682ddf692442204fba SHA-1: 1b3d164f6793c11cc7283d78fa7fb08fc7a95d01 SHA-256: 80b1d58755587a0e3287aa11ce472bc657ddc4b5a11ab7347ad058644db9973f
322 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1140 Deobfuscate or Obfuscate

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing VBA macros. The AutoOpen macro utilizes WScript.Shell and CreateObject to execute a Base64-decoded shell command stager. This stager is designed to download and execute a payload from the URL http://0knw2300.mypressonline.com/d.php, likely establishing a second-stage infection. The document body content is unrelated to the malicious functionality.

Heuristics 8

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • VBA Base64-decoded Shell command stager critical OLE_VBA_BASE64_SHELL_COMMAND_STAGER
    VBA auto-exec macro decodes Base64 string literals into command or script-launch text and executes the result with Shell. This catches cmd/cscript/PowerShell/VBS launchers hidden from plain keyword matching.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://0knw2300.mypressonline.com/d.php
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
c818a6daffcf79c3a5edc3e4c3fd7d3443eacec0e2ab1cd3f30640b4293e0e4f		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 5518 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
dbda86606e223a7463d91098a7f0b23b8e2cc27fdc41b69a7534611ab73c5ac6		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 42496 bytes

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