Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 80836871a4feb663…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

968.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: 1a36feb792700560115265a52f303804 SHA-1: 01ea6832a12a3876b08a1fd465dbec4813a19cb0 SHA-256: 80836871a4feb66368c92dfd3c323c446b55a57a94d2b584a8ee799b08a79d8d
132 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-0199 indicates that this OLE file attempts to exploit a vulnerability to load remote content. The embedded URL points to a lure for a Veeam hybrid cloud trial, suggesting a phishing or social engineering pretext. The embedded PDF, while encrypted and image-only, likely serves to obscure the malicious payload or further the lure. No VBA macros were found to be executable, but the primary exploit vector is clear.

Heuristics 6

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Encrypted PDF (string and stream contents are opaque to static scan) info PDF_ENCRYPTED
    PDF declares /Encrypt — string objects and stream contents are encrypted with the standard security handler (RC4 or AES). On its own this is informational; legitimate encrypted documents include signed contracts, billing statements, and rights-managed material. Static heuristics cannot inspect encrypted payload bytes.
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00000e00.pdf
540b49eb3907c1ae08e7856b7439bc239cd7f265041a44cfcf0b0e6b37263a27		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE00 987648 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006c00.pdf
4afeea3c707c740c9c1111adb237d6185cbfdbcc033ef2f0e067f0df20063519		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6C00 963584 bytes

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