Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCM — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 803727ccdf441e49…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCM

302.9 KB Created: 2024-07-19 10:29:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2024-07-22
MD5: dd2100dfa067caae416b885637adc4ef SHA-1: 499f8881f4927e7b4a1a0448f62c60741ea6d44b SHA-256: 803727ccdf441e49096f3fd48107a5fe55c56c080f46773cd649c9e55ec1be61
458 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is a DOCM file containing VBA macros, specifically a Document_Open macro that utilizes WScript.Shell and cmd.exe. This indicates an attempt to execute arbitrary commands, likely to download and run a second-stage payload. The presence of a clipboard command execution lure and LOLBin references in the document text further supports a social engineering attack vector to prompt user interaction for execution.

Heuristics 13

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • LOLBin reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_LOLBIN
    LOLBin reference in VBA
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • cmd.exe reference in VBA high OLE_VBA_CMD
    cmd.exe reference in VBA
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
  • External hyperlinks (22) low OOXML_EXTERNAL_HYPERLINKS
    Document contains 22 external hyperlinks — clickable URLs are stored as external relationships. First target: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/statement-on-falcon-content-update-for-windows-hosts/
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://172.104.160.126:8099
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahash
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape
    • https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2280386
    • https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2281008
    • https://aka.ms/vs/17/release/vc_redist.x64.exe
    • https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/statement-on-falcon-content-update-for-windows-hosts/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
45f10b769fca7341170dc9ca98befc6e39f9716a98c28df27ee7980078534512		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 17506 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
c8f4bcc3a32a579c5f3664c9a283768b98d61468739590395e5419c5eaba49fb		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 39936 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.