Malicious Office (OOXML) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8033d09cba976043…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .XLSX

27.9 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 14.0300 First seen: 2026-05-19
MD5: a8d5cb3bb933ae5faedf842a52406bd0 SHA-1: 7a9bf8c46a291c5ff6560b29ad09f66a02dfdbee SHA-256: 8033d09cba97604352a29d3288e64dbdbc26f53f0987b0966a86dc212055988d
242 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The file contains Excel 4.0 macros, which are known to be used for malicious purposes. These macros contain strings indicative of downloading and executing files, such as DownloadToFileA and ShellExecuteA. The macros reconstruct URLs from cell arrays, specifically http://abiann.com/ds/11.gif and http://abiann.com, which are likely used to fetch a secondary payload. The presence of WinAPI and download strings within the macro sheet strongly suggests an intent to download and execute further malicious content.

Heuristics 5

  • Excel 4.0 macro sheet (1 sheet(s)) critical 3 related findings OOXML_XLM_MACROSHEET
    Spreadsheet contains an Excel 4.0 (XLM) macro sheet — XLM was a major Office malware vector during 2020-2022 and evaded many VBA-focused controls before Microsoft tightened XLM defaults. Even legitimate XLM use is rare in modern workbooks. The macro sheet is stored as XLSB/BIFF12 binary content, which many XML-only OOXML scanners miss.
  • Binary XLM macro sheet with WinAPI/download strings critical OOXML_XLM_BINARY_WINAPI_STRINGS
    Excel 4.0 macro sheet is stored as BIFF12/XLSB binary data and contains Win32 download or process-execution API strings such as URLDownloadToFileA, ShellExecuteA, or CreateDirectoryA. These strings are high-signal in XLM macro sheets and catch payload-download macros that XML-formula scanners cannot parse.
  • XLM payload reassembled from CHAR()/split formulas critical OOXML_XLM_REASSEMBLED_PAYLOAD
    An Excel 4.0 macro sheet builds its payload inside the formula token stream by concatenating per-character CHAR() calls and string fragments, so no WinAPI name, shell command, or URL is ever contiguous in the .bin for a literal-bytes scan to find. Reassembling the formulas recovered download/execute API names, LOLBin commands (regsvr32/rundll32/mshta/wmic/powershell), or a payload URL — the de-obfuscated download-and-run kill chain.
  • URL reconstructed from XLM cell array (2 URLs) critical OOXML_XLM_CELL_ARRAY_URL
    Excel 4.0 macro sheet stages its payload URL across individual numeric cells (one ASCII charcode per cell), inside an embedded HTA that uses VBScript Chr()/&-concat obfuscation, or split across multi-char fragment cells a download formula concatenates by reference (=A1&A2&… / CONCATENATE(...)). The reconstructed URL is invisible to literal-bytes URL extraction because it is never contiguous in the workbook stream. URLs were recovered by walking the BIFF12 record stream of every worksheet and macrosheet part and decoding RK/inline-string/shared-string cells in row-major and column-major order plus FORMULA cell-reference concatenation in token order.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://abiann.com Referenced by macro
    • http://abiann.com/ds/11.gifReferenced by macro

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
xlm_sheet_00.bin xlm-macrosheet OOXML XLM macro sheet: xl/macrosheets/intlsheet1.bin 197254 bytes
SHA-256: 6f02aa931bc8e4a2ab1d0c806aeb00c15f6d0fda3430fbef88b29f418db86361
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
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... (truncated)