RTF malware analysis — malicious · 80334969da5f315c

MALICIOUS

RTF

218.0 KB First seen: 2022-04-18

MD5: c879b4a48bbe7a203aafa76178f9d3ce SHA-1: e69480888bd1b565a12549213f2f6b3a2292200e SHA-256: 80334969da5f315c306d806fdb8afcaa66dbbcb867c0882ab7906f9c002252f3

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple embedded OLE objects, with specific heuristics indicating the use of ".objupdate" and Composite Monikers, suggesting an attempt to trigger OLE activation. The document body explicitly instructs the user to 'download the document and click Enable Editing', a common lure for macro execution. No scripts were extracted, but the presence of embedded OLE objects and the explicit user interaction prompt strongly indicate a malicious payload delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 6

Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED

RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off0000095d.bin` `1c963ca0850392075941e5c180f0ba4a29aed35bfec1bb143775178c8a200441`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x95D	15749 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s).
`objdata_01_off000089f1.bin` `7b74a822cc160a0a46dc6db6fcbc7a2291eea6fdb58fa98ed0d9b3907cb827e4`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x89F1	2632 bytes
`objdata_02_off00009f94.bin` `44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x9F94	12297 bytes

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