Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 801f84a6140361c2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

84.3 KB Created: 2021-07-06 17:02:16 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-14
MD5: 9010e1450c1e4a470284f487e908f476 SHA-1: efce44a6cebf485f8349f1d92e742f517d78cbf6 SHA-256: 801f84a6140361c28d231db638faa7dc529290a6e49f54f42b714941bbcd110d
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

The PDF file was flagged as malicious by ML classifiers and ClamAV, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. Heuristics indicate the document uses social engineering lures, specifically a fake download button and a browser extension installation lure, to trick the user into executing malicious content. The presence of numerous external URIs, some pointing to compromised WordPress uploads, suggests the document is part of a phishing or malware distribution campaign.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9992

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ketchas.ru/uplcv?utm_term=find+my+cv+attached+with+this+email PDF link annotation
    • http://www.kliningstroy.ru/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607b2a9245294---73007389851.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://study-abroad-travel.com/ckfinder/userfiles/file/gezes.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.sgestrecho.es/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607a23cbd3a00---88368077006.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cottonweb.net/userfiles/file/52916998335.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.guestquesttravelmedia.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/s6jj8d8f92jih9i62dh080e79a/gupotukur.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cfacgroupe.com/uploads/FCK_files/file/9668705506.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://beckydavidsonhomes.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608c50b508f8e---54412990315.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ledson.ru/upload_picture/35132519187.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://axwelindia.com/uploads/38061978920.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://leo.tw/upload/ckeditor/files/pegemik.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.hotel-margherita.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608ef8f0524a4---junozogiwipipaf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ceral.pl/ceral/pliki/file/rigagevaxi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://limpiasol.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bf8a6c7aeb2---risuzozak.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.anclupnapoli.it/userfiles/file/puwodunojaturavajotaj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.peopleoftheheath.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606f620d27fee---38125912204.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://neoville.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8624fce5e980882755eeb618de4d8d39/gelogozowodanisinadididaj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kalatranslation.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/1f7a48a4ogth53h8j75a22ss4t/4876010325.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.bestlifepolicy.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16091946092760---94458743737.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e877.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE877 16640 bytes
SHA-256: 4228ee2cdb0818e004069c22576c81d935ea5f7cbb428f1bd39d36401348ff63
font_01_sfnt_off000113c3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x113C3 10656 bytes
SHA-256: f8b611bc0ed35bb422db6c18546c6e09abb78123835b1f8418a7b92457260ef6
font_02_sfnt_off00012c06.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12C06 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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