Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7ff0d5a1030f58f1…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

19.9 KB
MD5: 0f114d06a58a39d6d29eb1ce0fc2c0ee SHA-1: 96ff8e82569a7049c7fe8a3f468ffb7dab2ca19e SHA-256: 7ff0d5a1030f58f15496cebfab6069cc46e0d7b56bf7573f6dd56f3a84c0a2e0
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model

The RTF file contains embedded OLE object data, specifically related to Equation Editor. Heuristics indicate the activation of Equation Editor with a critical severity, strongly suggesting the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution when the embedded object is activated.

Heuristics 5

  • Obfuscated Equation Editor ProgID + activation critical CVE related RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID from top-level \objdata hex after nested RTF junk groups are ignored, and the document also contains \objemb plus \objupdate activation. This is an obfuscated Equation Editor exploit surface associated with CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 families, but no exact malformed MTEF CVE primitive was recovered from this object.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001aee.bin
6dc9a3a9b7893f921d6a8baf77a371358e89c287f870854e5018cddf207ceeda		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1AEE 1564 bytes

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