Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7fe770f2a75d6930…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

991.2 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 09d4af0b227dc3974954cc05f28bf8bc SHA-1: 473e5ddb68275afba681213c7293219f93c8a7d4 SHA-256: 7fe770f2a75d693076b3f2c81baa8bf27ba82d84b287bb5df381cc214b95eb6b
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 Malicious Link

The file is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor. Critical heuristics indicate exploitation of CVE-2017-8759, a known vulnerability in MSXML that allows for OLE activation. This suggests the document is designed to deliver a malicious payload by exploiting this vulnerability when opened.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000f2b5f.bin
cf16cc259c27e4bd3af1c92cd814f676e3033ab9c6c772607da5d3f31ab8eeea
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xF2B5F 3739 bytes