Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7fa337ce0ebf8bf9…

MALICIOUS

PDF

40.6 KB Created: 2020-07-10 01:58:27 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: fd17eb61e862b93afc97430664ac8924 SHA-1: 6e85e2a6025e65db0d887034c81e3ec465fc6866 SHA-256: 7fa337ce0ebf8bf96ffffb467ec669a111f3d00f22399c0846e4a7a73d8fc6db
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links pointing to external PDF files hosted on various domains, indicating a link farm or SEO manipulation scheme. One critical heuristic identified a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure. While no scripts were extracted, the nature of the embedded links suggests a potential distribution vector for further malicious content or a method to artificially inflate search engine rankings.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/wb?keyword=area%20of%20rectangles%20parallelograms%20triangles%20and%20trapezoids%20worksheet%20answers
    • http://files.bauerfamilygoldens.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407823/kuvunano.pdf
    • http://files.nmffa.org/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969819/deniz.pdf
    • http://files.waverail.com.au/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740538/26c65.pdf
    • http://files.tutuadorabow.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775392/getixar.pdf
    • http://files.eugenemontgomery.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438766/zesolabugilobe.pdf
    • http://files.bareblisswaxing.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132303282/7923269.pdf
    • http://files.bigmindbigsoul.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453560/nepenizeruragogiwuf.pdf
    • http://files.djcattrellauthor.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132814476/1be4b29d.pdf
    • http://files.japan-trademark-patent.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969306/4567437.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://kidelipubosu.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/fewivisezoposulej.pdf
    • https://janojape.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/jufojirepasidivinosag.pdf
    • https://zaludevibam.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/16606636017.pdf
    • https://fujosane.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/pakuzukifavelutozugalimex.pdf
    • https://jemuxotuwigi.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/30548146818.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/90067119925.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/66916333827.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/69865881622.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/vuvuwagel.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/gujogu.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000603b.bin
162bd4c79179e2e939d79060c3d0e7190964d24c63ee7e67a5dab6e4ac151be5		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x603B 5552 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000730a.bin
e213ceaf8c1e135bb0f2f27fdae79864c47f870a7461690aa200d4a0d15dba22		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x730A 9832 bytes

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