RTF malware analysis — malicious · 7fa04e3b789c281e

MALICIOUS

RTF

66.7 KB First seen: 2023-08-10

MD5: fc3f858e64fb4d2b341672db3757e89c SHA-1: e0329e1537a5816aa4540e62a202dc597c1132cf SHA-256: 7fa04e3b789c281e7e5290c0a9a20fb0ee2d922da39f2079a71f16c9b109cb38

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object and uses an \objupdate directive, indicating an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'click Enable editing from the yellow bar above', a common tactic to bypass security measures and trigger the exploit. No scripts were extracted, and no specific family could be identified.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000029ed.bin` `88f4d168ae11975313812d6f2670a40771e3ffe3e66f49f46687b1002c01b13e`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x29ED	1625 bytes

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