Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7f9805db0143bfc1…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.48 MB
MD5: 2f920a338dc1a855eaa9bcd923f4ded7 SHA-1: b48e2f6d137cff5d8d0167aa1b03d3854ff75f2d SHA-256: 7f9805db0143bfc1c9ffa29f7654d44b77317cf0615481b831490b69c8c365d1
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of exploiting CVE-2017-11882, specifically through the Equation Editor OLE object. The presence of \objupdate and split ProgID firings strongly suggests this vulnerability is being leveraged for initial execution. The embedded OLE object is the primary mechanism for delivering the exploit, likely intended to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000f58.bin
2001efca4eb084e6934398a6e4a3c28c04074201b1d023434641ec2e11874030		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xF58 35472 bytes
objdata_01_off0001f3ce.bin
02caa540b4e047d624c4392bc52a3662b57dab578bd1a3358b99362f97cf411d		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1F3CE 386485 bytes

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