Office (OLE) / .XLS malware analysis — malicious · 7f5b60bfba7dbdee

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

276.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-07-14

MD5: ca38c69784be8d1417cee3d794749004 SHA-1: 60c485a405b850ed551e1a131b1c8980f7a2f03b SHA-256: 7f5b60bfba7dbdee5afedb87c990ac5ebee5d5ccbcfd1afdb881c1869944a614

134 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic CVE_2017_0199 indicates the sample is designed to exploit a vulnerability in OLE to load remote content. The embedded URL, http://192.3.243.146/40/v/ICUICUICUICUICUIUCIUCIUCIUCIU%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23ICUICUICUICUICUCIUCIU.DOC, is likely the source of the secondary payload. The presence of multiple embedded PDFs with suspicious findings further supports a multi-stage attack. No VBA macros were found to be executable, but the core exploit mechanism is clear.

Heuristics 6

OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199

Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE

A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL

The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE

PDF has 1 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://192.3.243.146/40/v/ICUICUICUICUICUIUCIUCIUCIUCIU%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23ICUICUICUICUICUCIUCIU.DOC

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	1206 bytes
`font_00_sfnt_off0000817d.bin` `68d167e68895a344f3603a4efd0d8438eb8fdebe759cee48f2b4adf75c76c961`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x817D	12100 bytes
`font_01_sfnt_off00009f95.bin` `50551000b9f90b3f445ee94749557d9ddf96697a74984b3ccf3d2bae66910750`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9F95	15820 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off00000e00.pdf` `de747c7a8abe4dfb78d2e802ca2b17ff131f09d9bbc5310c4f21dbe83d9204e3`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE00	279552 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off00006000.pdf` `81eb1e1bd0174dde888add3e143ffc54418767fb3186ccba3457c090697bd216`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6000	258560 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off0000e200.pdf` `e356ab90b31f4cf7c98d30a68f09e84887b56ee0a3d06c152287300c58ff37de`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE200	225280 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off00015e00.pdf` `21d1d5c5722ad176b2e388dfea609174550840f0c594861971d79f25e81b5be6`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x15E00	193536 bytes

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