RTF malware analysis — malicious · 7f4c3b1a665c0cfa

MALICIOUS

RTF

86.8 KB First seen: 2023-09-29

MD5: b53d71a64cb165fb5bd36e7f22879546 SHA-1: 0ba27f31bdd7a0847d012556266ae899685c730d SHA-256: 7f4c3b1a665c0cfac753aaae7812e6d60585a0a878ed1d8fa021be401abaa94d

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object and specifically targets the Equation Editor vulnerability. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic indicates the document prompts the user to enable editing, which is a common tactic for macro-based malware droppers. The presence of ".objdata" and ".objupdate" sections further supports the exploitation of OLE object vulnerabilities.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off0000683c.bin` `8677c60eefc70c6a8d0d589c45836cb293331e7b7b32428d423b21dfcddd195c`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x683C	1554 bytes

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