Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7f403ccc0ea4df30…

MALICIOUS

RTF

3.8 KB First seen: 2021-07-10
MD5: 19ae3b8f68e97c5f71771f3d8c6df0f5 SHA-1: a2b262feb5f72632e9ce7ac519733223b684af46 SHA-256: 7f403ccc0ea4df309fd3cf1db4294bc4b8605af6011e877aeca7e4e93f7c1de1
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. This indicates the file is designed to exploit a known flaw in Microsoft Equation Editor to achieve code execution upon opening. The presence of ".objupdate" further suggests an attempt to force the activation of the embedded OLE object, likely to trigger the exploit.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000a9.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA9 1712 bytes
SHA-256: 5bcc4fc4d6d63cfe71ed69048b530ddbaaf2d25808c123adb2ad6952aa01a5be