Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7f359371e419a446…

MALICIOUS

PDF

73.1 KB Created: 2021-02-03 03:54:59 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-04-25
MD5: 8c8281353d7144712d159a076493a2ab SHA-1: f150781e479b638087c5cccdf522faae39101402 SHA-256: 7f359371e419a446d93874fbca4e07f8778f698d4bac025f835990c247bab3e7
266 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • MFA / one-time-code harvesting lure high SE_MFA_LURE
    Document asks for a one-time code, authenticator approval, or MFA confirmation — consistent with credential phishing kits that steal session tokens or abuse multi-factor authentication
  • Remote-support tool lure high SE_REMOTE_SUPPORT_LURE
    Document instructs the user to install, open, or connect with a remote-support tool such as AnyDesk, TeamViewer, Quick Assist, or ScreenConnect — high-risk in an unsolicited document
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://maypoin.ru/wb?keyword=splashtop%20apk%20android PDF link annotation
    • http://kpovli.ru/dieta_sirt_gratisrtxzy.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://duketexu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134725944/8c40e3079.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://suzixibaru.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134709676/tivupakowufal.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fisupipegapug.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134515512/290277.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://italysummer.space/980983643084kmzg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kiwitelovig.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134358902/jibejulefaxupe_kezivirageki_mavatepafositug_nisajubulapuz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dazobexureza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383777/gokekolukadugu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bazafegaxu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383427/7007873.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://papafamibupa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775965/famorupekovenoj_manuke_milusif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bigudiwox.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135304820/luvafedutu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://igme.site/arealme_english_test_answersv2fgu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zujuwedidikaf.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134375258/3506124.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/potamotaz/gatotkaca_guide_2019.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/baritexovopa/47212840570.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xetasif/12244748892.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000dd96.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDD96 5216 bytes
SHA-256: 2f355fc80798d223dbb050e82b9d85a64b4627b0c1e3bd47c511fa00361095fd
font_01_sfnt_off0000ef45.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEF45 12304 bytes
SHA-256: a0cd1d7d0a679f3f437d4d2071f1d89e6ec367c6ca40a94057265a348f4f4f33