Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7f03de65522759f3…

MALICIOUS

PDF

37.6 KB Created: 2020-09-12 21:09:27 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 74640b06dd770f5e47c55d66cd111ee4 SHA-1: 0ec9501c79e30879314e805caff5a9bf125c9fe6 SHA-256: 7f03de65522759f3f135cf488de7b160cc80de27c81efeb1d7c68220c1755801
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains a large number of embedded URLs, many of which point to domains associated with link farms and redirectors. One critical heuristic identified a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness. The embedded URLs are the primary indicators of malicious activity, suggesting a campaign to drive traffic to potentially harmful sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.me/wix?keyword=hayestown+avenue+school+danbury+ct
    • http://sibatuvuw.cammcdonaldphoto.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814017/1806713.pdf
    • http://rafupo.northstarscc.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776485/2055764.pdf
    • http://liganudeb.placentaoc.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380213/kejivopusag-zonilugonobij.pdf
    • http://files.maggieshao.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131454466/dowikajube-kurakezejunobab.pdf
    • http://mesoke.windowartgallerykingston.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398104/b8010.pdf
    • http://fopuz.barndoorllc.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969536/84ec4.pdf
    • http://files.mthoodcustomhomes.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856212/649695.pdf
    • http://files.landonpetersonmedia.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131483053/7c9420d69ec0193.pdf
    • http://mugojazib.virginkidsacademy.org/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857363/bfa82826d52.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/8a419d_9f85eeeec6bb4e42a4fa489786e72ae3.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/ecec20_2605d91f5863474691fccb0b8944d62c.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/7e0eb0_a0512f52a9ba4b0db3b7561fde14565a.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_7cb0ee5adfb24ba4a3983900ed71a7a7.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/d9d1f5_fc090a4b83244f0da2902b21f73ccf50.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/1a94e8_b6a7b81b948347749bcf3185b81f17ad.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000525c.bin
546482378968be5a87783955eec53ff155468bc8cf2a6a2c29c496d0f95e8aa3		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x525C 5380 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000064b9.bin
c97f915f4985b3ca7370dbb42a47ba9d8e637ce19851dae701c5310e3ad7d50a		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x64B9 11088 bytes

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