Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7eea207a47b3d8f2…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

11.0 KB
MD5: cccc704c7cf3240858812c0182ba882b SHA-1: 0cac0b1c0d5763f3a0d5161ef02e44347ce47abf SHA-256: 7eea207a47b3d8f24cd7b6453ed81dd1868049747ffe02ad81ed3f01ff2fd771
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE object data and triggers heuristics for the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive indicates that the embedded object will be activated, leading to exploitation. This is a common method for delivering malicious payloads via email attachments.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000229.bin
5feec6623e00e49f70d2903497e39cffc716ed031200cdcea0edca56a7bd097a
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x229 2096 bytes