Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7e863f1c886d4169…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

25.6 KB First seen: 2023-05-02
MD5: de22353c9ac8ee03fd53bee49b867919 SHA-1: e4ed3fe6be9b9cbfe88e38b399c65da0df210d98 SHA-256: 7e863f1c886d41690c1626abe000aad850194b11f8606ca739fc8e5e2c77b8e4
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

The RTF document contains heuristics indicating the presence of an OLE object and a split Equation Editor ProgID, suggesting an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic confirms that the document instructs the user to enable editing, a common tactic for malware droppers. The embedded OLE object data is likely part of the exploit chain.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000453e.bin
1342fc5737251708ed648c5532b869f946312bfec8b694edb10e898e69758ec9
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x453E 1389 bytes