Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7e856c818fde5116…

MALICIOUS

RTF

27.7 KB First seen: 2022-11-18
MD5: 7507aeba0e033179a4a0118265257c36 SHA-1: 16618b6c94468fb5f425bc17c658b5f60300264c SHA-256: 7e856c818fde5116ee6a75652db24ceeb249eae45ecd5bc30b4592e4c9b61667
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate suggests that the object is configured to activate automatically upon opening, and the document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing'. This combination strongly suggests the document is designed to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability to execute a malicious payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004c6a.bin
91e59c3fa166eeba767c5da58ec2b2cc07e273b86a5f088285be3e92122dd68a
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4C6A 1952 bytes