Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7e6f33d97caf9422…

MALICIOUS

PDF

299.1 KB Created: 2009-12-12 19:55:38 +01:00 Authoring application: Writer (via OpenOffice.org 3.1)
MD5: 4a9e0386daa65b5f54d82c7715d36041 SHA-1: 84d01c97a739873fec4889603be3d31bbb017341 SHA-256: 7e6f33d97caf9422892f5de7f5c25269f68e355d0ad8049112fb08499e2c4a7c
626 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

This PDF file exploits CVE-2010-1240 via a launch action that executes cmd.exe. It also contains an embedded executable disguised as a PDF file named 'embedded_OpenBSD.pdf'. The document lures the user into performing actions that could lead to credential theft or recovery secret compromise. The embedded JavaScript is likely involved in the payload delivery or execution chain, though its exact function is obscured.

Heuristics 16

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\embedded_OpenBSD.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Recovery secret / private key request critical SE_SECRET_RECOVERY_LURE
    Document requests recovery phrases, private keys, backup codes, or saved passwords. Requests for these secrets in a document are high-risk.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-21832 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-21832
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://glozer.net/soekris/soekris.html
    • http://256.com/gray/docs/soekris_openbsd_diskless/
    • http://www.nmedia.net/~chris/soekris/
    • http://www.kernel-panic.it/software/bowlfish/
    • http://www.pcengines.ch/
    • http://www.soekris.com/
    • http://www.kernel-panic.it/openbsd/embedded/embedded3.html#3.4
    • http://www.kernel-panic.it/openbsd/embedded/embedded3.html#3.3
    • http://www.kernel-panic.it/openbsd/embedded/embedded3.html#3.2
    • http://www.pcengines.ch/alix.htm
    • http://www.pcengines.ch/wrap.htm
    • http://www.soekris.com/net4521.htm
    • http://www.kernel-panic.it/openbsd/vpn/index.html
    • http://www.kernel-panic.it/openbsd/carp/index.html
    • http://www.kernel-panic.it/openbsd/embedded/
    • http://www.onlamp.com/pub/a/bsd/2004/04/29/Big_Scary_Daemons.html
    • http://www.onlamp.com/pub/a/bsd/2004/03/11/Big_Scary_Daemons.html
    • http://www.openbsd.org/faq/faq6.html
    • http://www.openbsd.org/faq/faq5.html
    • http://www.openbsd.org/faq/faq4.html
    • http://www.openbsd.org/faq/faq14.html#Boot386
    • http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=fstab&sektion=5
    • http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=exports&sektion=5
    • http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=rc.conf.local&sektion=8
    • http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=bootparams&sektion=5
    • http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=bootparamd&sektion=8
    • http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=portmap&sektion=8
    • http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=boot&sektion=8
    • http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=pxeboot&sektion=8
    • http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=inetd&sektion=8
    • http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=tftpd&sektion=8
    • http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=tftp&sektion=1
    • http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=dhcpd&sektion=8
    • http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=hosts&sektion=5
    • http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=ethers&sektion=5
    • http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=rarpd&sektion=8
    • http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=strip&sektion=1
    • http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=crunchgen&sektion=8
    • http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=syslogd&sektion=8
    • http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=rc&sektion=8
    • http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=netstart&sektion=8
    • http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=rc.shutdown&sektion=8
    • http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=rc.conf&sektion=8
    • http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=sysctl&sektion=8
    • http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=sysctl.conf&sektion=5
    • http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=ttys&sektion=5
    • http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=newsyslog&sektion=8
    • http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=touch&sektion=1
    • http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=syslog.conf&sektion=5
    • http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=moduli&sektion=5
    +28 more URL(s)

Extracted artifacts 10

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_OpenBSD.pdf
92913d87535feace91d7b3c042b9e8d9418fc4b02355a12184e54c137a893374		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 239 at offset 0x45BFD 37888 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
javascript_obj0240_000.js
3945b326198abf8499102a6832b0452ac1732dfbd85395551393d685fd0f5f34		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 240 at offset 0x4A881 65 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off0000e803.bin
24f3c91f8415ba12ebf2f4b5efe5f0b9a2ed920643aec645907d0572fb9f7792		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE803 17728 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0001136e.bin
346f05ee89adb9298acf148615f25ba0c79726e8b525e1b0de3d48b9ed94595c		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1136E 46088 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00018c0f.bin
6951ce1a3c846dccefb0ff2234c64a85b76130485224be022a08610e7796ac5a		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x18C0F 43416 bytes
font_03_sfnt_off0001fbc2.bin
c1c993177bd5df47adff594eeba9628544469d7ba944592ea5f828dfc1ec7918		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1FBC2 49232 bytes
font_04_sfnt_off000277a7.bin
cbc66039f92fb46139dd8122edd5b73d179e12dbeefcba2cc495df536fa05e52		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x277A7 20108 bytes
font_05_sfnt_off0002a63f.bin
b2fb4391cd4e349c88367fa271068a8c02ecdbd5baf9b73a55b00094d0b84e7a		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2A63F 53860 bytes
font_06_sfnt_off00033c5f.bin
5713ec775467ae774e717c8026ae4348da2e4310a0377f9e87c931e154c34601		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x33C5F 25728 bytes
font_07_sfnt_off00037f83.bin
2c4384034919a0992c729f21562b4b0f33504896859d142c6658eb49dc5bd87f		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x37F83 35468 bytes

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