Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7e62faffb62feaab…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.1 KB
MD5: 7d3904d6c520a459b57d804bc54e313a SHA-1: 5d00835d8c1933d5c6f4202caf449159575ae047 SHA-256: 7e62faffb62feaab58ebbf73204c4166669a857fd93c2a019e55d740929bc1f5
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. The ".objupdate" directive indicates that the embedded OLE object will be activated upon opening, leading to the exploitation of the Equation Editor. This is a common delivery mechanism for exploiting client-side vulnerabilities to download and execute further payloads.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000af.bin
14f048a7826684f6b0f4b497b2f50084fa74ed96888c939a3fd5d857e7ee1fdc
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAF 1858 bytes