Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7e4925140942ee05…

MALICIOUS

RTF

109.8 KB First seen: 2019-05-10
MD5: 2b94fcef44071a2bbd8e8cd0f82e5146 SHA-1: 9a994f03935fa4629a59dee71fc3d7d3e20d2cc3 SHA-256: 7e4925140942ee0559ac03a6966d2f734388137e7e40245fdc0e01045c4ef766
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document containing OLE object data and a specific Equation Editor ProgID, indicating exploitation of a known vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, leading to client-side code execution. No specific family could be identified, and no network IOCs were extracted.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000d2de.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD2DE 1529 bytes
SHA-256: 53e908b385c9ebddb06e336c8b6bf4e10f966bcb3c3a7be6f3ae7cd5a3b2ccea