Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7e450ed1e5e672f7…

MALICIOUS

PDF

72.7 KB Created: 2021-02-13 02:29:39 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-04-25
MD5: caf8c5c996386dfeeac81b91446bfe8f SHA-1: fb6a44088ae7a27f1444afb0f0c556eab8ab6838 SHA-256: 7e450ed1e5e672f79d1959689fd5e2137931b62db78ef1d9fc080b9787b25617
254 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://yafferge.ru/wix?keyword=starting+over+again+full+movie+openload In PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/wuvukidovime/gjapM2g/nenufesosumul.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/xadowififux/gIFqhjb/mirrors_for_sale_craigslist_funny.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/kikutajaz/ehjjgic/60227565053.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bifixebuwo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776276/64b6901bc39.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4392664/normal_6006e0342b1d2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4410207/normal_5ffa7a2164738.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4391634/normal_5fe6587278e16.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zizusufake.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134646877/wodixopoxasamedu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4471091/normal_5ff4ff1eafbe5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vojofarakiva/IBxgjkf/ftdi_chip_usb-_rs485-_we-_1800-_bt.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xifupanudolegu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164204/51e8c5e046ef5c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wimugedi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134725841/samotebisotuj-nopamunoluro.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jakujakula/19714954051.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/kotenu/deped_ept_reviewer_with_answer_key.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gewisetug/70837670674.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/fenatagazise/limigoxusutejifog.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/rijaliwiguvex/biozone_answers_online.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d206.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD206 5228 bytes
SHA-256: 7197e7aa4738175ac280f3053d63deb3be8d7ce49d74547bd49f16d85f7f8181
font_01_sfnt_off0000e3b3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE3B3 10400 bytes
SHA-256: 542c95685ff5b09882574f880dfbbe3bb61521dc3ad24b83a257a837ce8b9318
font_02_sfnt_off0001075b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1075B 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 1062cd8ddf90f4344fa193b395386d5669df1a952e5759311ca261a71931f361

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