Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7e0190720c6e909c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

39.1 KB Created: 2020-09-30 03:27:33 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: c1227652e450d3df39637175c9fb474f SHA-1: f21ab6f9bacb0cc2cb6eacdb4415aea6986ac17d SHA-256: 7e0190720c6e909ce39ec862f4b45eace2871ac3e23832fe5194478d9c35cca2
204 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/strik?keyword=blessed+be+the+lord+god+almighty+sheet+music+pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.cumberlandbusinessconnector.ca/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398117/gakapeluketipi-zivavo-lupixi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.bipolarplan.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739835/6122091.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.aperfectinjustice.org/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438071/gibavadili_rugolunes_nujagogizi_fusupiwa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mupiritux.threeprinciplesandagingwithgrace.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132302846/wixenesugetali.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://migavaw.zetagammalcu.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406069/muzapogus.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.ncwknittersguild.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453213/326d04a2c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wosijox.claystories.com.au/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738779/05dbab430.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00004bb3.bin)
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00004bb3.bin)
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/0832/7829/files/dafidobenaz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/3a538106-7c53-40a4-9bcc-6248d42ed15e/zuzuwozafekutu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/1cbf5528-1086-4f47-bf60-9e1d6a7fc321/lugemiruguvusa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/55b077de-4c5b-4d0a-a0cf-93680052f70b/segitulusaxi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/394dec82-e708-403d-9260-89151d03b5b2/tepabowipevivokabukavoj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00004bb3.bin)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00004bb3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4BB3 5860 bytes
SHA-256: cb60721c45219bc11e5a3f4fbc767a953daca2d1e5cda599efdc44300ada0f5f
font_01_sfnt_off00005f86.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5F86 14928 bytes
SHA-256: c87dd3318e0c4b3ac761b7626a77d1ea503ef16d5f8ac4cf2a4c4b7cf793766b