Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7df20f7e7ad4245a…

MALICIOUS

RTF

1.88 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 0c94d94ed6b6a0ce216f2bfad9a52916 SHA-1: ac0cf4886a22114900fbfc7a52964ced3908ca1c SHA-256: 7df20f7e7ad4245af8a45dab843d61b15676e2109fbd8372f3ad2af2ae8b21d3
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-8759). The ".objupdate" directive indicates that the embedded object is intended to be activated automatically upon opening the document, leading to the exploitation of the Equation Editor. This suggests the file is designed to deliver a malicious payload via this known exploit.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off001d82ed.bin
c6d7933534e91e79c8548704da1e26c81b1f17f14addda3c38940c7a4662fcdc		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1D82ED 3739 bytes

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